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H – 1152

International Court of Justice

H1152 - 0002

Index to British Document Book

No. 3

(Aggression against Norway & Denmark)

Document Number. (Exhibit No.	Date	Description	German Reference (If any)
T C 17 ( )	2 June 1926	Treaty of Arbitration Germany - Denmark	R.G.B.1927 Teil II Nr S 40 - 49
T C 24 ( )	31 May 1939	Treaty of Non-Aggression Germany - Denmark	R.G.B.1939 Teil II Nr S 856 - 85
T C 30 ( )	29 April 1939	Assurances to Scandinavia	
T C 31 ( )	2 Sept. 1939	Assurance to Norway	
T C 32 ( )	6 Oct. 1939	Assurance to Norway	D.D.P.Vol. I, p. 350
T.C 55 ( )	9 April 1940	German Ultimatum to Norway and Denmark	D.D.P. Vol.VIII. I.p. 21 -
T C 56 ( )	1 Oct. 1945	Report of C.in C. Norwegian Navy	
C 5 ( )	9 Oct. 1939	Doenitz memo on base in Norway	
C 41 ( )	3 June 1940	Memo by Frieke on Bases	
C 63 ( )	27 Jan.1940	Keitel order on preparations for Weserübung	
C 64 ( )	12 Dec.1939	Raeder report on Hitler meeting, re Norway	
C 65 ( )		Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder re visit of Quisling	
C 66 ( )	10 Jan.1944	Memo Raeder to Assman	
C 115 ( )	4 April 1940	Naval operation order re Weserubung	

H1152-0003

Document Number (Exhibit No.)	Date	Description	German Reference (If any)
C 122 ( )	3 Oct. 1939	Naval War Diary. Questionnaire on Norway bases.	
C 151 ( )	30 Mar.1940	Operation Order for 'Hartmut'	
C 174 ( )	1 Mar.1940	Hitler Order for operation 'Weserübung'	
D 627 ( )	25 Apr.1940	Dispatch, British Minister in Copenhagen.	
D 628 ( )	Undated	Memorandum of Danish Government	
007 PS ( )	Undated	Rosenberg report on A.P.A. from 1933 - 1943.	
1546 PS ( )	Undated	Raeder memo on occupation of Norway	
1809 PS ( )	Feb.1940 - May 1940	Entries from Jodl's Diary.	

Exhibit GB 76
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 17.

[1]TRANSLATION.

No. 1444 - TREATY OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION BETWEEN GERMANY AND DENMARK.

SIGNED AT BERLIN, JUNE 2, 1926.

The German Reich and The Kingdom of Denmark, being desirous of promoting the development of the procedure for the pacific settlement of international disputes, have agreed to conclude a general Treaty of arbitration and conciliation.

For this purpose they have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the German Reich:

Dr. Gustav Stresemann, Reichminister for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland:

M. Herluf Zahle, Chamberlain, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berlin,

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

Article 1.

The Contracting Parties undertake to submit to the procedure of arbitration or conciliation, in conformity with the present Treaty, all disputes of any nature whatsoever which may arise between Germany and Denmark and which it has not been possible to settle within a reasonable period by diplomacy or to bring, with the consent of both Parties, before the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Disputes for the solution of which a special procedure has been laid down in other conventions in force between the Contracting Parties shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of such conventions.

Article 2.

The disputes which, at the request of either of the Parties, shall be submitted to arbitration procedure are those arising between the two Parties with regard to points of law, and particularly with regard to the following subjects:

Firstly, the existence, interpretation and application of any treaty concluded between the two Parties;
Secondly, any question of international law;

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[1]Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

H1152 - 0004

H1152 - 0005

Thirdly, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;

Fourthly, the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach.

In the case of disagreement between the Parties as to whether a dispute falls under one of the above categories, this prior question shall be settled by arbitration.

Article 3.

In regard to questions which, under the national laws of the Party against which a demand has been formulated, fall within the competence of the judicial authorities, including the administrative tribunals, such Party may require that the dispute shall not be submitted to arbitration until judgment with final effect has been pronounced by these authorities, and, further, that the matter shall be brought before the arbitration tribunal not later than six months after the date of such decision. The above provisions shall not apply if justice has been refused and if the matter has been brought before the appeal authorities provided for by law.

Disputes between the Parties regarding the application of the preceding provision shall be settled by arbitration.

Article 4.

The tribunal shall base its decisions:

Firstly, on general or special Conventions in force between the Parties, and the principles of law arising therefrom;

Secondly, international custom as evidence of a general usage accepted as law;

Thirdly, the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations;

Fourthly, the results of recognised doctrine and legal practice as aids in the establishment of rules of law.

Subject to the consent of the two Parties, the arbitral tribunal may, instead of basing its decision on legal principles, give an award in accordance with considerations of equity.

Article 5.

In the absence of agreement to the contrary between the Parties in each particular case, the arbitration tribunal shall be constituted as follows:

The arbitrators shall be chosen from the list of members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration established by The Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

Each Party shall appoint two arbitrators, of whom one only shall be a national of that Party. The Parties shall jointly nominate the fifth arbitrator, who shall also be the President of the tribunal. The President shall not be of the same nationality as any of the other arbitrators. He may not be domiciled within the territory of either Party, and he may not be or have been in the service of either Party.

New arbitrators shall be chosen for each individual dispute. The Contracting Parties, however, reserve the right to concert measures so that for a certain class of dispute the tribunal shall consist of the same arbitrators for a definite period.

H1152 - 0006

Vacancies occurring in the tribunal for any cause whatsoever shall be filled in the manner fixed for the nominations.

Article 6.

In each individual case the Contracting Parties shall, in pursuance of the present Treaty, draw up a special agreement (compromis) stating the subject of the dispute, any special powers conferred on the tribunal, its composition, the place where it shall meet, the amount that each Party shall deposit in advance to cover expenses, the rules to be observed in regard to the form and time-limits of the proceedings, and any other details that may be necessary.

Any disputes regarding the terms of the special agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article 7, be settled by the arbitration tribunal.

Article 7.

If the special agreement has not been drawn up by the Parties within a period of six months after one Party has notified the other of its intention to refer the dispute to arbitration, either Party may request the Permanent Board of Conciliation, provided for under Article 13, to draw up the agreement. The Permanent Board of Conciliation shall, within two months after the question has been submitted to it, establish the special agreement, the subject of the dispute being determined on the basis of the statements furnished by the Parties.

The same procedure shall be followed when either of the Parties fails to nominate the arbitrators for whose appointment it is responsible, or when the Parties cannot agree upon the appointment of the President.

Pending the constitution of the arbitration tribunal, the Permanent Board of Conciliation shall also be competent to adjudicate upon any other dispute relating to the special agreement.

Article 8.

The decisions of the arbitration tribunal shall be taken by a majority vote. The opinion of any member of a minority of the tribunal who dissents from the award shall, at his request be duly placed on record.

Article 9.

The arbitration award shall specify the manner in which it is to be carried out and, in particular, indicate the time-limits to be observed.

If it is established in an arbitration award that a decision or measure of a court of law or other authority of one of the Parties is wholly or partly at variance with international law, and if the constitutional law of that Party does not permit, or only partially permits, of the consequences of the decision or measure in question being annulled by administrative means, the arbitration award shall allow the injured Party equitable satisfaction of another kind.

Article 10.

Subject to any provision to the contrary in the special agreement, either Party may submit to the Tribunal which gave the award a request for the revision of the award. This request may only be justified by the discovery of a fact which would have been likely to exercise a decisive influence on the award, and which, at the time of the close of

H1152 - 0007

the proceedings, was unknown to the tribunal itself and to the Party demanding the revision, unless the Party in question was at fault in not being aware of it. At the request of either Party, the arbitration tribunal shall first decide whether the above conditions applicable to a request for revision are fulfilled.

Members of the arbitration tribunal who for any reason do not take part in the revision proceedings shall be replaced in the manner fixed for their appointment.

The period within which the request provided for in the first paragraph may be presented shall be fixed in the arbitral award, unless this has already been laid down in the special agreement.

Article 11.

Any dispute arising between the Parties as to the interpretation and execution of the arbitral award shall, subject to any agreement to the contrary, be settled by the tribunal which made it. In that case the provision contained in the second paragraph of Article 10 shall apply, mulatis mutandis.

Article 12.

Any dispute which under the preceding Articles of the present Treaty cannot be referred to arbitration, and which is not settled amicably in some other manner with the consent of the two Parties, shall, at the request of either of the Parties concerned, be submitted to the procedure of conciliation.

If the opposing Party claims that a dispute for which conciliation procedure has been initiated should be settled by the Permanent Court of International Justice, or by the arbitration tribunal, or by means of a special procedure as provided for in Article 1, second paragraph, the body who jurisdiction is claimed shall decide this prior question.

The Governments of the Contracting Parties may agree that a dispute which under the terms of the present Treaty can br brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice or an arbitration tribunal shall be submitted to a procedure of conciliation, either without appeal or subject to appeal to the Permanent Court of International Justice or an arbitration tribunal.

Article 13.

A Permanent Board of Conciliation shall be constituted for the procedure of conciliation.

The Permanent Board of Conciliation shall consist of five members. Each Contracting Party shall appoint two members, one of whom may be one of its own nationals. The Parties shall jointly nominate the fifth member, who shall be the Chairman. The Chairman shall not be of the same nationality as any other member. He shall not be domiciled within the territory of either Party, nor shall he be or have been in the service of either Party.

The members of the Permanent Board of Conciliation shall be appointed for a period of three years. In the absence of any agreement to the contrary between the Contracting Parties, their appointment should not be revoked during their term of office. Should no successor be appointed to a member of the Board of Conciliation on the expiration of his term of office, that term shall be regarded as renewed for a period of three years. The Chairman shall, however, retire on the expiration of his term of office should either of the Contracting Parties so request. Should the term of office of any member expire while

H1152 - 0008

proceedings are still pending, such member shall continue to take part in the examination of the dispute until the termination of the proceedings whether his successor has been appointed or not.

Subject to the stipulations of the second paragraph of the present Article, either Contracting Party may, within fourteen days from the date when a dispute has been referred to the Permanent Board of Conciliation, replace, for the examination of the particular dispute, one of the members whom it has appointed by a person possessing special competence in the matter. The Party making use of this right shall immediately inform the other Party; the latter shall in that case be entitled to take similar action within fourteen days from the date when the notification reaches it.

The Permanent Board of Conciliation shall be constituted in the course of the six months following the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the present Treaty. Retiring members shall be replaced within the shortest possible time in accordance with the procedure laid down for the first election.

Should the Chairman not have been nominated within six months after the exchange of the instruments of ratification, or, in the case of a subsequent election, should a Chairman not have been appointed within three months from the retirement of the previous Chairman, His Majesty the King of Sweden shall, in the absence of any other agreement, be requested to make the necessary appointment.

Article 14.

The Permanent Board of Conciliation shall enter upon its duties as soon as a dispute is referred to it by either of the Parties. Such Party shall communicate its request simultaneously to the Chairman of the Permanent Board of Conciliation and to the other Party. The Chairman shall summon the Permanent Board of Conciliation to meet at the earliest possible moment.

The Parties undertake to facilitate, in all circumstances and in every respect, the work of the Permanent Board of Conciliation, and in particular, to afford it all possible legal assistance through their competent authorities. They shall use all the means at their disposal to allow it to take the evidence of witnesses and experts in their respective territories and to visit the localities in question. The Board may obtain evidence either in pleno or through its Chairman.

Article 15.

The Permanent Board of Conciliation shall fix its place of meeting and shall be at liberty to change it.

Article 16.

The deliberations of the Permanent Board of Conciliation shall be valid if all the members have been duly convened, and if the Chairman and at least one of the members appointed by each Party are present.

Decisions of the Permanent Board of Conciliation shall be taken by a majority vote. If the votes are equally divided the Chairman shall have a casting vote.

Article 17.

The Permanent Board of Conciliation shall draw up a report which shall set out the facts of the case, and shall, unless it may seem undesirable in the particular circumstances of the case, contain

H1152 – 0009

proposals for the settlement of the dispute. In the report the opinion of any member of a minority of the Board who dissents from its conclusions shall, at his request, be duly placed on record.

The report shall be submitted within six months from the date on which the dispute was laid before the Permanent Board of Conciliation, unless the Parties agree to extend, or, before the Permanent Board of Conciliation has met, to shorten this time-limit. The report shall be drawn up in three copies, one of which shall be handed to each of the Parties and the third deposited in the archives of the Permanent Board of Conciliation.

The report shall not, either as regards statements of fact or as regards legal considerations, be in the nature of a final judgment binding upon the Parties. When submitting its report the Permanent Board of Conciliation may call upon the Parties to state, within a time-limit to be fixed in the report, whether, and within what limits, they recognise the correctness of the findings of the report and accept the proposals which it contains.

The Parties shall jointly decide whether the report shall be published immediately. If they fail to reach an agreement on this point, the Permanent Board of Conciliation may cause the report to be published immediately should there be special reasons for so doing.

Article 18.

Each Party shall bear the cost of the emoluments due to the members of the Permanent Board of Conciliation appointed by itself and shall bear half the cost of the Chairman's emoluments.

Each Party shall defray the expenses which it has itself incurred in connection with the proceedings and half of the expenses which the Permanent Board of Conciliation declares to be common to both Parties.

Article 19.

The award made as a result of the procedure of arbitration shall be carried out in good faith by the Parties concerned.

The Contracting Parties undertake during the course of the arbitration or conciliation proceedings to refrain as far as possible from any action liable to have a prejudicial effect on the execution of the arbitral award or on the acceptance of the proposals made by the Permanent Board of Conciliation.

The arbitration Tribunal may, at the request of either of the Parties, prescribe precautionary measures, provided they can be carried out by the Parties by administrative means. The Permanent Board of Conciliation may also make proposals for the same purpose.

Article 20.

Subject to any provisions to the contrary laid down in the present Treaty or in the special agreement, the procedure of arbitration and conciliation shall be regulated by The Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

In so far as the present Treaty refers to the stipulations of The Hague Convention, the latter shall continue to be applicable to the relations between the Contracting Parties, even if one or both of them should have denounced The Hague Convention.

In so far as the present Treaty or the special agreement or any other Conventions in force between the Parties do not lay down the time-limits or other details connected with the procedure of arbitration or conciliation, the arbitration tribunal or the Permanent Board of Conciliation shall itself be

H1152 - 0010

Article 21.

The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Berlin.

The Treaty shall come into force one month after the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

The Treaty shall be valid for a period of ten years. Unless denounced six months before this period expires, it shall remain in force for a further five years, and shall be similarly renewed, so long as it has not been denounced within the prescribed period.

If a dispute which has been referred to the arbitration or conciliation has not been settled when the present Treaty expires, the case shall be proceeded with according to the stipulation of the present Treaty, or of any other agreement which the Contracting Parties may decide to substitute therefor.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done in duplicate in German and Danish at Berlin, June 2, 1926.

(Signed) HERLUF ZAHLE.

(Signed) STRESEMANN.

FINAL PROTOCOL

TO THE GERMAN-DANISH TREATY OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION.

1. The Contracting Parties are agreed that in doubtful cases the various stipulations of the present Treaty shall be interpreted in favour of the application of the principle of the settlement of disputes by arbitration.

2. The Contracting Parties declare that the Treaty shall also apply to disputes arising out of events which occurred prior to its conclusion. It shall not, however, apply to disputes with regard to claims for compensation arising out of military measures taken during the world war.

3. The Treaty shall not cease to be applicable if third States are concerned in a dispute. The Contracting Parties shall endeavour, if necessary, to induce the third States to agree to accept the procedure of arbitration or conciliation. In this case, the two Governments may, if they so desire, arrange by common consent that the Tribunal or the Permanent Board of Conciliation shall be constituted in a special manner. If no agreement is reached with the third States within a reasonable period, the procedure between the Contracting Parties shall take the course prescribed in the Treaty, but shall take effect only as far as they themselves are concerned.

4. In the event of Germany acceding to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague or becoming a Member of the League of Nations, legal disputes in regard to which the two Parties have been unable to agree as to whether the dispute should be brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague or be submitted to arbitration may, at the request of either Party, be referred direct to the Permanent Court of International Justice after one month's notice has been given to the other Party. The same stipulation shall apply if

H1152 – 0011

a general Treaty of arbitration between Germany and any third Power comes into force containing a similar provision.

Berlin, June 2, 1926.

(Signed) HERLUF ZAHLE.

(Signed) STRESEMANN.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES.

BETWEEN THE DANISH AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS
ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY
OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, DATED JUNE 2, 1926,
BETWEEN DENMARK AND GERMANY.

Royal Danish
Legation.

Berlin, June 2, 1926.

Your Excellency,

With reference to the signature to-day of the Danish-German Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation, I am instructed by my Government to inform you as follows:

"Should the Parties not have reached an agreement within one month after the Permanent Board of Conciliation has concluded its proceedings, the dispute may be referred by either Party to the Council of the League of Nations, which shall deal with the case as provided in Article XV of the Covenant of the League of Nations."

It is further understood that disputes between Germany and a third State to which Denmark, as a Member of the League of Nations, may be a Party shall not be regarded as disputes between the Contracting Parties within the meaning of the present Treaty. The same stipulation shall apply, as soon as Germany shall have become a Member of the League of Nations, to disputes between Denmark and a third State to which Germany, as a Member of the League of Nations, may be a Party.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) HERLUF ZAHLE.

Dr. Gustav Stresemann,
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Berlin.

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, June 2, 1926.

Your Excellency,

In reply to your letter of to-day's date, I have the honour, on behalf of the German Government, to confirm the following declaration with reference to the signing to-day of the German-Danish Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation;

In the event of Germany becoming a Member of the League of Nations, the provisions of the Treaty regarding the procedure of conciliation

H1152 - 0012

shall be supplemented by the following provision:

"Should the Parties not have reached an agreement within one month after the Permanent Board of Conciliation has concluded its proceedings, the dispute may be referred by either Party to the Council of the League of Nations, which shall deal with the case as provided in Article XV of the Covenant of the League of Nations."

It is further understood that disputes between Germany and a third State, to which Denmark, as a Member of the League of Nations, may be a Party, shall not be regarded as disputes between the Contracting Parties within the meaning of the present Treaty. The same stipulation shall apply, as soon as Germany shall have become a Member of the League of Nations, to disputes between Denmark and a third State to which Germany, as a member of the League of Nations, may be a Party.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) G. STRESEMANN.

His Excellency M. Zahle,
Minister of His Majesty the King
of Denmark.

Exhibit GB 77
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 24

No. 4603 - TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH AND THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK.

SIGNED AT BERLIN, MAY 31st 1939.

His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland and the Chancellor of the German Reich,

Being firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and Germany in all circumstances, have agreed to confirm this resolve by means of a Treaty and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland:

M. Herluf Zahle, Chamberlain, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Berlin;

The Chancellor of the German Reich:

M. Joachim von Ribbentrop, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich;

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

Article 1.

The Kingdom of Denmark and the German Reich shall in no case resort to war or to any other use of force one against the other.

Should action of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 be taken by a third Power against one of the Contracting Parties, the other Contracting Party shall not support such action in any way.

Article 2.

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged as soon as possible in Berlin.

The Treaty shall come into force on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a period of ten years from that date. Should the Treaty not be denounced by one of the Contracting Parties at least one year before the expiry of that period, its validity shall be extended for a fresh period of ten years. The same shall apply to subsequent periods.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of both Parties have signed the present Treaty.

Done in original duplicate, in Danish and German.

BERLIN, May 31st, 1939.

HERLUF ZAHLE.

JOACHIM V. RIBBENTROP.

H1152 – 0013

H1152 - 0014

PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE.

On the signature, this day, of the Dano-German Treaty, the agreement existing between the two Parties on the following point has been put on record:

The Contracting Party which is not participating in the conflict shall not be deemed to be giving support, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Treaty, if the attitude of that Party is in harmony with the general rules of neutrality. Therefore the fact of a normal exchange of goods and transit of goods continuing between the Contracting Party not involved in the conflict and the third Power shall not be regarded as constituting illicit support.

BERLIN, May 31st, 1939.

HERLUF ZAHLE.

JOACHIM V. RIBBENTROP.

Exhibit GB 78
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 30

TC 35

TC 39

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO DENMARK, NORWAY,
BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS, APRIL 28th, 1939.

"I have given binding declarations to a large number of States. None of these States can complain that even a trace of a demand contrary thereto has ever been made to them by Germany. None of the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend that a request has ever been put to them by the German Government or by German public opinion which was incompatible with the sovereignty and integrity of their State."

"I was pleased that a number of European States availed themselves of these declarations by the German Government to express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality. This applies to Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, etc. I have already mentioned France. I need not mention Italy, with whom we are united in the deepest and closest friendship, Hungary and Yugoslavia, with whom we as neighbours have the fortune to be on very friendly terms. On the other hand I have left no doubt from the first moment of my political activity that there existed other circumstances which represent such a mean and gross outrage of the right of self-determination of our people that we can never accept or endorse them. I have never written a single line or made a single speech displaying a different attitude towards the above-mentioned States. On the other hand with reference to the other cases I have never written a single line or made a single speech in which I have expressed any attitude contrary to my actions."

H1152 - 0015

Exhibit G.B. 79
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 31.

[English Translation]

Avskrift

GERMAN LEGATION

AIDEMÉMOIRE

The German Reich Government is determined, in view of the friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under no circumstances to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In making this declaration the Reich Government naturally expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur. Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate.

OSLO, 2nd September 1939.

This is to certify that the above is a trye copy of the Aide-Mémoire which was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo on the 2nd of September 1939.

OSLO, 3rd October 1945.

(signed) TRYGVE LIE

Foreign Minister.

H1152 – 0016

Exhibit G.B. 80
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 32

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO NORWAY OF OCTOBER 6, 1939

Ref: Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Vol. VII, I, p.350

2. Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the northern States, neither has she any today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they do not feel themselves threatened in any way.

TC 37

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO BELGIUM OF OCTOBER 6, 1939.

Ref: Dokumente der deutschen Politik Vol. VII, I, p. 351.

5. Belgium.

Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the state I tried to create friendly relations with Belgium I renounced any revision or any desire for revision. The Reich has not made any demands which would in any way be likely to be considered in Belgium as a threat.

TC 41

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO THE NETHERLANDS OF OCTOBER 6, 1939.

Ref: Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Vol. VII, I p. 351.

4. Holland.

The new Reich has endeavoured to continue the traditional friendship with Holland. It has not taken over any existing differences between the two countries and has not created any new ones.

TC 43

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA OF OCTOBER 6, 1939

Ref: Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Vol. VII, I, p. 352.

7. Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that, from now on, the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in peace and friendship with her.

1457

H1152-0017

H1152 - 0018

Exhibit G.B. 92
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

T.C. 55.

GERMAN ULTIMATUM (MEMORANDUM) TO THE NORWEGIAN (AND DANISH GOVERNMENTS DATED APRIL 9, 1940.

Ref: Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Vol. VIII, I, pp. 21-31.

Contary to the sincere desire of the German people and their Government to live in peace and amity with the English and French peoples, and in spite of the absence of any reasonable grounds for mutual strife, those in power in London and Paris have declared war on the German nation.

With the unleashing of this war of aggression against the existance of the German Reich for which they had long been preparing, En England and France have also started a maritime war against the neutral world.

Whilst, with complete disregard of the elementary rules of international law, they sought to direct a starvation blockade against German women, children, and old people, at the same time they subjected neutral States to their ruthless blockade measures. The immediate consequences of these methods of warfare initiated by England and France, which we contary to international law and which had to be met by Germany with countermeasures, were the most severe damage to neutral shipping and to neutral trade. This English procedure, however, dealt th very conception of neutrality a shattering blow.

Germany, for her part, has made equally serious efforts to preserve the rights of neutral countries by her endeavours to limit maritime warfare to maritime zones lying between Germany and her opponents. In contrast to this, England, with the object of diverting danger from her islands and at the same time of preventing German trade with neutral countries has expended greater and greater efforts on carrying maritime warfare into neutral waters. In pursuance of this truly British method of waging war, England has taken belligerent action in the territorial waters and regions of Denmark and Norway to an ever increasing degree and in flagrant breach of international law.

From the outbreak of the war Germany had foreseen this development. Through her economic policy at home and abroad she has known how to frustrate the attempt made by the British starvation blockade against the German nation and to prevent the strangulation of German trade.

This has caused the complete collapse of the British blockade policy to become increasingly evident in recent months.

These developments, together with the hopelessness of any direct attack on German western defences and the growing anxiety in England and France in the face of the successful German counterattacks at sea and in the air, have recently caused both nations to make increasingly serious efforts to carry the theatre of war by every means in their power into the neutral mainland both within and outside Europe. It goes without saying that, following the British tradition, England and France, in making these attempts, have the small European states in view in the first place. During recent months English and French states-men have quite openly proclaimed the extension of the war to these territories to be the fundamental strategical concept of their conduct of the war.

H1152 - 0019

The Russo-Finnish conflict offered the first occasion for this. The English and French Governments had expressed quite openly their intention to intervene with military force in the conflict between Soviet Russia and Finland, and to use the territory of the northern States as a base of operations for this purpose.

Only the early conclusion of peace in the North, which occurred contrary to their wishes, hindered them from putting this resolution into effect at that time. If English and French statesmen subsequently declared that they would have made the carrying out of this intention dependent upon the concurrence of the Scandinavian States, that is a gross untruth. The Reich Government has documentary proof in its possession, showing that England and France had together decided if necessary to carry out the action through the territories of the Nothern States even against their will.

The decisive factor is, however, the following:

From the attitude of the French and the English Governments before and after the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish Peace, and from the documentary evidence actually in the hands of the Reich Government, there is indisputable proof that the decision to assist Finland against Russia should over and above that serve to aid further plans.

The further aim of England and France in Scandinavia was and primarily is:

1. By the occupation of Narvik to cut off Germany from her ore supply route in the North.

2. In the landing of English and French fighting forces in Scandinavian countries to establish a new front in order to attack Germany's flank from the North.

In this way the northern countries would serve as a theatre of war of the English and French forces, whilst the northern people in accordance with an age-long English tradition, would be allotted the role of auxiliary and mercenary troops.

As by reason of the conclusion of the Finnish-Russian peace, this plan was frustrated. it then became even clearer to the Reich Government that England and France were making decisive endeavours immediately to realise and develop their plans in a different way.

With the urgent necessity of preparing an intervention in the North, in recent weeks the English and French Governments openly proclaimed the thesis that there could be no neutrality in this war, and it was the duty of small countries actively to take part in the war against Germany. This thesis was prepared for by propaganda from the Western Powers, supported by ever-increasing political pressure on the neutral countries. Concrete reports regarding forthcoming endeavours of the Western Powers to land in Scandinavia accumulated recently more and more. If there ever was the slightest doubt regarding the definite decision of the western Powers to intervene in the North, it has finally been removed during the last few days.

The Reich Government has in its possession conclusive evidence that England and France intended to effect a surprise occupation of certain territories in the northern countries within the next few days.

H1152-0020

The northern countries have on their side not only not offered any resistance to these encroachments by England and France but have even tolerated without taking any counter measures the greatest encroachments on their sovereign rights.

The Reich Government must, consequently, assume that the Royal Norwegian Government will adopt the same attitude towards the preparations and fulfilment of plans of action now intended by England and France. But even if the Royal Norwegian Government had intended to take countermeasures, the Reich Government was quite certain that the Norwegian military forces would not be sufficient to be able to oppose the English-French actions successfully.

In this decisive phase of the fight for existence forced on the German people by England and France, the Reich Government can in no circumstances tolerate that Scandinavia should be made the theatre of war against Germany by the Western Powers, and the Norwegian people, whether directly or indirectly, mis-used in a war against Germany.

Germany does not intend to await idly or to put up with such a realisation of the opponents' plans. The Reich Government therefore has to-day begun certain military operations, which will lead to the occupation of strategically important points on Norwegian territory. The Reich Government therewith undertakes the protection of the Kingdom of Norway for the duration of the war. It has resolved, from now on, to protect peace in the North with all its power against any English-French attack, and finally to assure it.

The Reich Government did not wish for this development. England and France alone bear the responsibility. Both States proclaim quite hypocritically the protection of small countries. In reality, however, they offer violence to these (smaller countries) in the hope thereby to be able to realise their will to destroy, directed against Germany and daily more openly announced.

The German troops therefore do not set foot on Norwegian soil as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against England, as long as it is not forced to do so by measures taken by England and France. German military operations aim much more exclusively at protecting the North against the proposed occupation of Norwegian strongpoints by English-French forces.

The Reich Government is convinced that by this action it is at the same time serving Norway's interests. For this protection by the German Wehrmacht offers the Scandinavian peoples the only guarantee that during this war their countries will not become a field of battle or a theatre of perhaps most terrible engagements.

The Reich Government thus expects that the Royal Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people will respond with understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to it. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all possible means by the German Forces employed and would therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal Norwegian Government is therefore requested to take all measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the German troops can take place without friction and difficulties.

In the spirit of the good German-Norwegian relations that have always existed, the Reich Government declares to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Norway now or in the future.

1455.

H1152 - 0021

T.C. 55.

GERMAN ULTIMATUM (MEMORANDUM) TO THE NORWEGIAN (AND DANISH GOVERNMENTS DATED APRIL 9, 1940.

Ref: Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Vol. VIII, I, pp. 21-31.

Contary to the sincere desire of the German people and their Government to live in peace and amity with the English and French peoples, and in spite of the absence of any reasonable grounds for mutual strife, those in power in London and Paris have declared war on the German nation.

With the unleashing of this war of aggression against the existance of the German Reich for which they had long been preparing, En England and France have also started a maritime war against the neutral world.

Whilst, with complete disregard of the elementary rules of international law, they sought to direct a starvation blockade against German women, children, and old people, at the same time they subjected neutral States to their ruthless blockade measures. The immediate consequences of these methods of warfare initiated by England and France, which we contary to international law and which had to be met by Germany with countermeasures, were the most severe damage to neutral shipping and to neutral trade. This English procedure, however, dealt th very conception of neutrality a shattering blow.

Germany, for her part, has made equally serious efforts to preserve the rights of neutral countries by her endeavours to limit wartime warfare to maritime zones lying between Germany and her opponents. In contrast to this, England, with the object of diverting danger from her islands and at the same time of preventing German trade with neutral countries has expended greater and greater efforts in carrying maritime warfare into neutral waters. In pursuance of this truly British method of waging war, England has taken belligerent action in the territorial waters and regions of Denmark and Norway to an ever increasing degree and in flagrant breach of international law.

From the outbreak of the war Germany had foreseen this development. Through her economic policy at home and abroad she has known how to frustrate the attempt made by the British starvation blockade against the German nation and to prevent the strangulation of German trade.

This has caused the complete collapse of the British blockade policy to become increasingly evident in recent months.

These developments, together with the hopelessness of any direct attack on German western defences and the growing anxiety in England and France in the face of the successful German counterattacks at sea and in the air, have recently caused both nations to make increasingly serious efforts to carry the the ire of war by every means in their power into the neutral mainland both within and outside Europe. It goes without saying that, following the British tradition, England and France, in making these attempts, have the small European states in view in the first place. During recent months English and French states- men have quite openly proclaimed the extension of the war to these territories to be the fundamental strategical concept of their conduct of the war.

H1152 -0022

The Russo-Finnish conflict offered the first occasion for this. The English and French Governments had expressed quite openly their intention to intervene with military force in the conflict between Soviet Russia and Finland, and to use the territory of the northern States as a base of operations for this purpose.

Only the early conclusion of peace in the North, which occurred contrary to their wishes, hindered them from putting this resolution into effect at that time. If English and French statesmen subsequently declared that they would have made the carrying out of this intention dependent upon the concurrence of the Scandinavian States, that is a gross untruth. The Reich Government has documentary proof in its possession, showing that England and France had together decided if necessary to carry out the action through the territories of the Nothern States even against their will.

The decisive factor is, however, the following:

From the attitude of the French and the English Governments before and after the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish Peace, and from the documentary evidence actually in the hands of the Reich Government, there is indisputable proof that the decision to assist Finland against Russia should over and above that serve to aid further plans.

The further aim of England and France in Scandinavia was and primarily is:

1. By the occupation of Narvik to cut off Germany from her ore supply route in the North.

2. In the landing of English and French fighting forces in Scandinavian countries to establish a new front in order to attack Germany's flank from the North.

In this way the northern countries would serve as a theatre of war of the English and French forces, whilst the northern people in accordance with an age-long English tradition, would be allotted the role of auxiliary and mercenary troops.

As by reason of the conclusion of the Finnish-Russian peace, this plan was frustrated. it then became even clearer to the Reich Government that England and France were making decisive endeavours immediately to realise and develop their plans in a different way.

With the urgent necessity of preparing an intervention in the North, in recent weeks the English and French Governments openly proclaimed the thesis that there could be no neutrality in this war, and it was the duty of small countries actively to take part in the war against Germany. This thesis was prepared for by propaganda from the Western Powers, supported by ever-increasing political pressure on the neutral countries. Concrete reports regarding forthcoming endeavours of the Western Powers to land in Scandinavia accumulated recently more and more. If there ever was the slightest doubt regarding the definite decision of the western Powers to intervene in the North, it has finally been removed during the last few days.

The Reich Government has in its possession conclusive evidence that England and France intended to effect a surprise occupation of certain territories in the northern countries within the next few days.

H1152 - 0023

The northern countries have on their side not only not offered any resistance to these encroachments by England and France but have even tolerated without taking any counter measures the greatest encroachments on their sovereign rights.

The Reich Government must, consequently, assume that the Royal Norwegian Government will adopt the same attitude towards the preparations and fulfilment of plans of action now intended by England and France. But even if the Royal Norwegian Government had intended to take countermeasures, the Reich Government was quite certain that the Norwegian military forces would not be sufficient to be able to oppose the English-French actions successfully.

In this decisive phase of the fight for existence forced on the German people by England and France, the Reich Government can in no circumstances tolerate that Scandinavia should be made the theatre of war against Germany by the Western Powers, and the Norwegian people, whether directly or indirectly, mis-used in a war against Germany.

Germany does not intend to await idly or to put up with such a realisation of the opponents' plans. The Reich Government therefore has to-day begun certain military operations, which will lead to the occupation of strategically important points on Norwegian territory. The Reich Government therewith undertakes the protection of the Kingdom of Norway for the duration of the war. It has resolved, from now on, to protect peace in the North with all its power against any English-French attack, and finally to assure it.

The Reich Government did not wish for this development. England and France alone bear the responsibility. Both States proclaim quite hypocritically the protection of small countries. In reality, however, they offer violence to these (smaller countries) in the hope thereby to be able to realise their will to destroy, directed against Germany and daily more openly announced.

The German troops therefore do not set foot on Norwegian soil as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against England, as long as it is not forced to do so by measures taken by England and France. German military operations aim much more exclusively at protecting the North against the proposed occupation of Norwegian strongpoints by English-French forces.

The Reich Government is convinced that by this action it is at the same time serving Norway's interests. For this protection by the German Wehrmacht offers the Scandinavian peoples the only guarantee that during this war their countries will not become a field of battle or a theatre of perhaps most terrible engagements.

The Reich Government thus expects that the Royal Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people will respond with understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to it. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all possible means by the German Forces employed and would therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal Norwegian Government is therefore requested to take all measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the German troops can take place without friction and difficulties.

In the spirit of the good German-Norwegian relations that have always existed, the Reich Government declares to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Norway now or in the future.

1455.

Exhibit G.B. 93
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

TC 56

GERMAN PLANS FOR THE INVASION OF NORWAY.

From Reichsleiter Rosenberg's report to the Führer on the activity of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP it appears clearly that the NSDAP since 1933 has been endeavouring to obtain influence in Norway and the other Scandinavian countries.

When the war broke out it was mainly the OKM that was of the opinion that it would be necessary to invade Norway in order to get control of the Norwegian coast. Already in September 1939 the SKL (Seekriegsleitung) prepared a plan for the invasion of Norway.

In the beginning of December 1939, Vidkun Quisling, who for some months had been in close contact with the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP came to Berlin and alleged that England was preparing an attack on Norway with the tacit agreement of the Norwegian Government. Quisling's information supported the plans of Grossadmiral Raeder who evidently now managed to persuade Hitler to decide for the invasion of Norway.

The decision to invade Norway was thus taken in the middle of December 1939 and the planning was soon after started by a special staff ("Sonderstab") of the OKW. On the 19th Feb. 1940, 2 days after the Altmark-incident on the Norwegian coast, General v. Falkenhorst was called to the Führer, from whom he received orders to take command of the operations to be directed against Norway.

According to Generaloberst v. Falkenhorst's statement, Hitler gave the following reasons for the necessity of the attack:

a) to prevent a British strategic movement to the North which would threaten the North German coast

b) to obtain freedom of action for the German Navy

c) to keep open and defend the sea route along the Norwegian Coast.

H1152 – 0024

H1152 – 0025

The Germans, considering the long lines of communications and the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the necessity of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In order to paralyse the will of the Norwegian people to defend their country and at the same time to prevent allied intervention it was planned to capture all the more important towns along the coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament and other military and civilian people occupying important positions were to be arrested before organised resistance could be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new government with Quisling as the head.

In the early hours of the 9th April 1940, 7 cruisers, 14 destroyers and several torpedoboats and other small craft carrying advanced elements of 6 divisions totalling about 10,000 men forced an entry and landed troops in the outer Oslofjord, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. A smaller number of troops were also landed at Arendal and Egersund on the southern coast. In addition airborne troops were landed at aerodromes near Oslo and Stavanger.

The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser "Blucher", carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division, technical staffs and specialists who were to take over the control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and members of the Government and Parliament failed in spite of the surprise of the attack, resistance was organised throughout the country.

When the military resistance ceased 10th June 1940 the King and his Government were thus in a position to leave Norway and continue the war against Germany from outside the country.

It is hereby certified that this is a
true copy of the original statement
prepared by the C. in C. Royal Norwegian
Forces on the 1st of October 1945.

Oslo, 3rd October 1945.

(signed) TRYGVE LIE

Foreign Minister.

Exhibit G.B. 83
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

C 5

SEC24-1/C-5

FLAG OFFICER SUBMARINES
OPERATIONS DIVISION
B. Nr. MOST SECRET. SO. ONLY

Wilhelmshaven, 9.10.39

M-O-S-T S-E-C-R-E-T

To: Supreme Command of the Navy - Naval War Staff/ 1st Div.
No written reference.

Subject: Base in Norway

I. SUPPOSITIONS:

a) A position outside the Shetlands - Norway Straits.
b) Freedom from ice.
c) Rail communications.

These suppositions apply only to Trondheim and Narvik.

II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES:

1) Trondheim:

Advantages:

a) Position within the fiord which is unaffected by artillery action from the sea.
b) Deep water in the entry channels - difficult for the enemy to mine in their mining operations.
c) Existence of several entry and exit routes.
d) Protected areas directly in front of the harbour for exercises and entry.
e) Southern position: i.e. short lines of communications to Germany, better climatic conditions, shorter route to the Atlantic.
f) Basins which, according to the North Sea Handbook and instructions of the Navy Office at Hamburg, are suitable for U-boats.
g) Several industrial installations which facilitate the construction of repair - and supply installations.

Disadvantages:

Short distance from the bases of the British Air force - danger of air attack.

2) Narvik:

Advantages:

a), b), c), d) the same conditions as Trondheim

e) Greater distance from British bases - less danger of air attack.

H1152 - 0026

H1152 – 0027

Disadvantages:

a) Northern position: Long lines of communication to Germany, unfavourable climatic conditions, longer route to the Atlantic.
b) Communications only with the Baltic - The Gulf of Bothnia is not gree from ice.
c) No basins, quay-installations only in the bay.
d) Very few industrial installations.

Trondheim is therefore the more favourable place.

III. The following is therefore proposed:

1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:

a) Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen, provisions.
b) Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an encounter.
c) Good opportunities for accommodating U/boat crews.
d) Flak protection, L.A. armament, petrol and M/S units.

2) Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in Narvik as an alternative.

Sgd. Doenitz.

Exhibit GB 96
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

(SEC24-4/C-41)

C 41.

H1152-0028

COPY.

QUESTIONS OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND BASES.

I. These problems are pre-eminently of a political character and comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it is not the Navy's province to answer, but they also materially affect thestrategic possibilities open, - according to the way in which this question is answered - for the subsequent use and operation of the Navy.

It is too well known to need further mention that Germany's present position in the narrows of the Helogoland Bight, and in the Baltic - bordered as it is by a whole series of states, and under their influence, - is an impossible one for the future of Greater Germany. If, over and above this, one extends these strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the war.

The solution could perhaps be found among the following possibilities:

1) The territories of Denmark, Norway, and Northern France acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied and organised that they can in future be considered as German possessions.

This solution will recommend itself for areas where the severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy, and where a gradual "Germanising" of the territory appears practicable.

2) The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct connection with Germany's main body, and which, like the Russian solution in Hango, remain permanently as an enclave in the hostile state. Such areas might be considered possibly around Brest and Trondjem.

(Pencil Note) But this isn't at all the case with Trandjem.

This type of solution can only be discouraged. It is fraught with every conceivable weakness to which a bridgehead in a hostile country and national body, difficult of access, far removed from the home-land and thrown back on its own resources is subject. On the face of it the thought of having made provision for the outbreak of a fresh war is a right one. As, however, it has in mind the possibility of a war breaking out in the near or distant future, it is basically wrong and ineffectual.

(pencil Note) What does this mean in Norway's case?

3) The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas acquired in this war should result in the existing population of these areas feeling themselves politically, economically, and militarily, to be completely dependent on Germany. If the following results are achieved:- that expansion is undertaken (on a scale I shall describe later) by means of the military measures for occupation taken during the war - that French powers of resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, Armed Forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of the question - that the smaller states, such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway are forced into a dependence on us which will enable us in any circumstances and at any time easily to occupy these countries again - then in practice the same, but psychologically much more, will be achieved.

Pencil Note) No, I can't agree there as far as Trondjem is concerned. If we clear right out of Trondjem the British could make difficulties again one fine day.

H1152 - 0029

SEC24-4/C-41)

(Pencil Note) cont'd. We must have Trondjem!

The solution given in 3). therefore, appears to be the proper one, that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium, part of North and East France, to allow the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway to exist on the basis indicated above. To straighten out relations with Switzerland.

The possession of Iceland would mean material strategic expansion for Germany.

II.

(Pencil Note) YES.

I hould advise against the creation of bases in the North and South America, Asia or Australia. On the other hand contiguous possessions in Central Africa are considered extremely desirable - possessions which are made up of the area between Senegal and the Congo and stretch east as far as German East Africa - that is, they comprise: the French possessions say, South of the line of Latitude running through the mouth of the Senegal, the former German Colonies of Central Africa and the Belgian Congo. For the purpose of rounding off this area, German South West Africa could be considered as exchange territory for British or Portuguese possessions.

(Pencil Note) YES

The acquisition of one or more bases on the groups of islands off Africa would be of the greatest importance, and besides this the possession of Madagascar and the French groups of islands in the Indian Ocean.

Time will show how far the outcome of the war with England will make an extension of these demands possible.

l. Skl.

signed Fricke 3.6.40.

Exhibit G. No. 87
Filed Dec. 7, 1945
C 63.

Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces.

Berlin, 27.1.40

No. 22045/40 MOST SECRET WFA/Section L.

5 copies
2nd Copy.

Re. Study "N"

S.O. Only.
Access only through
an Officer.

Ref. 22039/40 Most Secret
WFA/Section L (1) of 23.1.40.

C-in-C of the Navy has a report on this.
Ia/29/i (Ink Note)

Noted by 1 SKL.
(Ink Note).

Note: Noted by
M K A, who takes
over the nominating
of Officers
(Probably Kapitän-
Leutnant z.S. Krulte?)
Ia/1
(Ink note)

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed forces wishes that Study "N" should be further worked on under my direct and personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the general war policy. For these reasons the Führer has commissioned me to take over the direction of further preparations.

A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces H.Q. for this purpose, and this represents at the same time the nucleus of a future Operational Staff.

I request the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force to nominate one officer each for this staff, suitable for Ia, and if possible possessing a knowledge of organisation and supply matters. The Bureau of Foreign Defence has the placing of the officer for Ic, WFA /+ , that of the officer concerned with transport matters, Senior Officer for communications and Senior Officer for general questions concerning the administration of the country.

The time of meeting will be announced later.

All further plans will be made under the cover name "Weserübung".

KEITEL.

+The invasion of Norway
/Armed Forces Operations Dept.

Distribution:

C-in-C of the Army	1st Copy
C-in-C of the Navy	2nd Copy
Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force.	3rd Copy
Armed Forces Ops Dept.	4th Copy
Section L.	5th Copy

H1152 - 0030

H1152-0031

Exhibit G.B. 86
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-64
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer on 12. 12. 39. 1200.
(Keitel, Jodl, Luftwaffe)

Norwegian question.

C. in C. Navy has received Quisling and Hajelin. Quisling creates the impression of being reliable and states that :

As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England's influence is very great especially through Storthing-President Hambro (Jew, a friend of Hore-Belisha), all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible occupation of Norway. In which case Sweden would also stand against Germany. Danger of Norway's occupation by England is very great - possibly very shortly. From 11. 1. 40 onwards the Norwegian Parliament and therefore the Norwegian Government is unconstitutional as Parliament in defiance of the constitution, prolonged its term by a year. This would give an opportunity for a political re-shuffle. Quisling has good connections with officers of the Norwegian Army and has supporters in important positions. (e.g. Railways) In such an event Quisling is ready to take over the Government and to call upon Germany for help. He is also ready to discuss preparations of a military character with the German Armed Forces.

C. in C. Navy points out that with such offers one never knows how far the people concerned are wishing to further the ends of their own party or how much they have German interests at heart. Therefore caution is indicated - - Norway must be prevented at all costs from falling into England's hands. That might have a decisive effect on the war; for Sweden would be completely under England's influence and it would bring the war into the Baltic, thus preventing completely the activities of the German Navy in the Ocean and the North Sea. The Fuehrer too said that a British occupation of Norway would be unbearable. C. in C. Navy pointed out that occupation by Germany of positions on the coast of Norway would naturally produce strong British countermeasures to stop the export of ore from Narvik, and that this would bring about surface warfare off the Norwegian coast, to which the German Navy was not equal for any length of time. This was one weak spot of the occupation.

The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a long while. C. in C. Navy suggests that if the Fuehrer forms a favourable impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation.

a) By peaceful means, i.e. German forces summoned by Norway , or

b) To agree to do so by force Fuehrer agrees (ink note)

H1152 - 0032

2) C. in C. Navy advocates that a very clear policy in the Russo-Finnish conflict be maintained. No help to Finland by the supply of arms (which would mean passing through unreliable Sweden).

The C. in C. Armed Forces states that the Swedish Foreign Office has been informed that arms would only be sent to Sweden, on guarantee in writing by the government that they were only for the use of the Swedish Armed Forces.

The C. in C. Navy on the other hand is in favour of concessions to Russia, for example the supply of oil to U-boats, as Russia would also offer us practical help, (Vorteile), for example, the holding of foreign steamers in Murmansk until three days after the "Bremen" has sailed.

The Fuehrer has agreed to both points.

RAEDER.

- - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-64

13 November 1945.

I, BETTY D. RICHARDSON, P.O. 66370, W.R.N.S. hereby certify that I am thoruoughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No.C-64.

BETTY D. RICHARDSON
P.O. 66370
W.R.N.S.

Exhibit USA 85
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

H1152 - 0033

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-65
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

MEMO

(Enclosure in a letter of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the C-in-C. of the Navy) (illegible notations)

Re - Visit of Privy Councillor Quisling - Norway.

Rounding out previous information, I inform you that Quisling is considered as one of the best known Scandinavian Officers of the General Staff, that he was military attache in Finland, and that he represented British interests in Moscow from 1927 to 1930 before the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the Soviet-Union and Great Britain. He was Norwegian Minister of War from 1931 - 33, being a representative of the Norwegian peasant party, then resigned and founded a National Radical Socialist party under the name of "National Party". This party held and still holds anti-Semitic views and stand for the closest collaboration with Germany, has 15000 registered members, and Quisling estimates the number of his immediate supporters as between 2 and 300,000, that is, that 10 per cent which, even amidst the manifest anti-German feeling in Norway and Sweden today, are in favour of collaboration with Germany. His party has also not taken any part in the elections for the Great Assembly (Storthing).

The reasons for a coup, which Quisling made a report, would be provided by the fact that the Storthing had, in defence of the constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister of War, the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of a letter which he had received only a short time previously from the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact that; if things went on as they were going at present, Norway was finished. He only hoped that there would still be sufficient of the nation left to be able tocreate a people out of the remains, which could then build up Norway again well and truly. It was right that the race of today should be relegated to obscurity, and one had to admit it didn't deserve any better fate; for as he saw it, the Norwegians had committed an offence against the unalterable law of the universe. This law demanded work and idealism, and stupidity had never been regarded as a plausible excuse. "I shall not do anything for the old boozer Madsen (Minister of Trade), the enemy of Defence Monsen (Minister of War), and the blockhead Nygolswold (Prime Minister). It may on the contrary be a good idea and a useful one, to spend one's time in risking one's neck for the national revival". signed Konrad Sunlo.

Amtsleiter Scheidt, who had been to Norway several times, and has a number of acquaintances there, says that the Commanding Officer of the largest drilling-ground, Hroslev, had expressed similar opinions, as had also the head of the Military Academy at Halden, Captain Fritzner.

The King knows Quisling very well from the time when he held office and he believes that the king also had a high opinion of him, even though he is, by and large, pro-British in his views. The Jew Hambro is cited as Germany's greatest enemy, and as possibly the most powerful personality in politics, who practically controls the policy of Scandinavia at the moment. He is President of the Storthing, who at the same time holds the office of President of the Foreign Committee. He is also leader of the League of Nations Delegation and Leader of the strongest political party, the so-called "Conservatives" with whom the fate of the present minority Government rests. Hambro also controls the communication system in Norway, and so there is reason to fear - and

H1152 - 0034

indeed shortly to fear - that as far as the anti-Russian feeling is concerned, which has increased by reason of the Russo-Finnish conflict, this will gain in strength in favour of England and against Germany in an increasing degree.

A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of a coup, and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a purpose, being allotted their exact tasks, and provided with experienced and die-hard National Socialists, who are practised in such operations. These trained men should the proceed with all speed to Norway where details would then require to be further discussed. Some important centres in Oslo would have to be taken over immediately, and at the same time the German Fleet together with suitable contingents of the German Army would go into operation when summoned specially by the new Norwegian Government in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo. Quisling has no doubts that such a coup, having been carried out with instantaneous success - would immediately bring him the approval of those sections of the Army with which he at present has connections, and thus it goes without saying that he has never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the king is concerned, he delieves that he would respect it as an accomplished fact.

Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations.

Signed.

A. Rosenberg.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-65.

15 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-65.

ERNST M. COHN.
Pfc. 33925738.

H1152 - 0035

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-65
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

MEMO

(Enclosure in a letter of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the C-in-C. of the Navy) (illegible notations)

Re - Visit of Privy Councillor Quisling - Norway.

Rounding out previous information, I inform you that Quisling is considered as one of the best known Scandinavian Officers of the General Staff, that he was military attache in Finland, and that he represented British interests in Moscow from 1927 to 1930 before the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the Soviet-Union and Great Britain. He was Norwegian Minister of War from 1931 - 33, being a representative of the Norwegian peasant party, then resigned and founded a National Radical Socialist party under the name of "National Party". This party held and still holds anti-Semitic views and stand for the closest collaboration with Germany, has 15000 registered members, and Quisling estimates the number of his immediate supporters as between 2 and 300,000, that is, that 10 per cent which, even amidst the manifest anti-German feeling in Norway and Sweden today, are in favour of collaboration with Germany. His party has also not taken any part in the elections for the Great Assembly (Storthing).

The reasons for a coup, which Quisling made a report, would be provided by the fact that the Storthing had, in defence of the constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister of War, the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of a letter which he had received only a short time previously from the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact that; if things went on as they were going at present, Norway was finished. He only hoped that there would still be sufficient of the nation left to be able to create a people out of the remains, which could then build up Norway again well and truly. It was right that the race of today should be relegated to obscurity, and one had to admit it didn't deserve any better fate; for as he saw it, the Norwegians had committed an offence against the unalterable law of the universe. This law demanded work and idealism, and stupidity had never been regarded as a plausible excuse. "I shall not do anything for the old boozer Madsen (Minister of Trade), the enemy of Defence Monsen (Minister of War), and the blockhead Nygolswold (Prime Minister). It may on the contrary be a good idea and a useful one, to spend one's time in risking one's neck for the national revival". signed Konrad Sunlo.

Amtsleiter Scheidt, who had been to Norway several times, and has a number of acquaintances there, says that the Commanding Officer of the largest drilling-ground, Hroslev, had expressed similar opinions, as had also the head of the Military Academy at Halden, Captain Fritzner.

The King knows Quisling very well from the time when he held office and he believes that the king also had a high opinion of him, even though he is, by and large, pro-British in his views. The Jew Hambro is cited as Germany's greatest enemy and as possibly the most powerful personality in politics, who practically controls the policy of Scandinavia at the moment. He is President of the Storthing, who at the same time holds the office of President of the Foreign Committee. He is also leader of the League of Nations Delegation and Leader of the strongest political party, the so-called "Conservatives" with whom the fate of the present minority Government rests. Hambro also controls the communication system in Norway, and so there is reason to fear - and

H1152 - 0036

indeed shortly to fear - that as far as the anti-Russian feeling is concerned, which has increased by reason of the Russo-Finnish conflict, this will gain in strength in favour of England and against Germany in an increasing degree.

A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of a coup, and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a purpose, being allotted their exact tasks, and provided with experienced and die-hard National Socialists, who are practised in such operations. These trained men should the proceed with all speed to Norway where details would then require to be further discussed. Some important centres in Oslo would have to be taken over immediately, and at the same time the German Fleet together with suitable contingents of the German Army would go into operation when summoned specially by the new Norwegian Government in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo. Quisling has no doubts that such a coup, having been carried out with instantaneous success - would immediately bring him the approval of those sections of the Army with which he at present has connections, and thus it goes without saying that he has never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the king is concerned, he delieves that he would respect it as an accomplished fact.

Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations.

Signed.

A. Rosenberg.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-65.

15 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-65.

ERNST M. COHN.
Pfc. 33925738.

Exhibit G.B. 81
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

SEC24-G/C-66 C-66.

(Memorandum for Admiral Assmann for his own information; not to be used for publications. With the signature "Raeder" and date 10 January 1944)

1. S.O. Only.

a) Barbarossa.

1) At this time the Fuehrer had made known his "unalterable decision" to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. Experience had shown that, after this, further warnings, unless entirely new situations arise, were completely useless. As Chief of Naval War Staff I was never convinced of the "Compelling necessity" for Barbarossa.

2) During the campaign in France and also during the beginning of preparation for Seelöwe+ - while the Fuehrer still had hopes of gaining control of the air, (which he too recognised as being as essential pre-requisite of Seelöwe), it was doubtless his intention after France's fall to concentrate on the Navy and Air Force. The Fuehrer described the moving of troops to the Eastern front in August to me as a large scale camouflage measure for Seelöwe. (A statement from the Supreme Command of the Army would have to be obtained on this point).

The Fuehrer very early had the idea of one day settling accounts with Russia; doubtless his general ideological attitude played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic Power; they would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian Gulf. The Russian measures against Finland and the Baltic States in 1939-40 probably further strengthened him in this idea.

The fear that air superiority over the Channel could no longer be attained (in the autumn of 1940) - a realisation which the Fuehrer, no doubt, gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, (who were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on England (our own losses,) (but which he did not openly express until well into September) - must undoubtedly have caused the Fuehrer, as far back as August and September, to consider whether - even prior to victory in the West - an Eastern campaign would be feasible, with the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the Continent).

The Fuehrer's statement of 21st July 1940 is an indication of reflection of this kind (Section 68) ("It is of course our duty to give careful consideration to the question of America and Russia!"); Furthermore, comments such as Section 76, dated 12. 8, dealing with the fortification of the North Norwegian fjords, and occasional statements regarding the meeting of Russian demands for the delivery of ships and heavy artillery, which show the Fuehrer's mistrust of the Russian attitude and his hope of evading certain commitments altogether.

+ Invasion of England.

H1152 - 0037

H1152 - 0038

b) Weser-Ubung.

The memo is wholly insufficient and does not correspond to the contents of the report. During the weeks preceding the report on 10. 10. 39 I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coats by Germany. I passed this letter on to C/SKL for their information and prepared some notes+ based on this letter for my report to the Fuehrer which I made on 10. 10. 39, since my opinion was identical with that of Admiral Carls, while at that time, SKL was more dubious about the matter. In these notes, I stressed the disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would have for us - control of the approaches to the Baltic, outflanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast - outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier as in the year 1917-18. Naturally at the time, only the coast and bases were considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the course of our correspondence, thought that Narvik could be excluded. (At that time, we were able to use Murmansk and/or a special Russian base.) The Fuehrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider the question himself.

In the further developments, I was supported by Commander Schreiber Naval Attache in Oslo and the M-Chief personally - in conjunction with the Rosenberg Organisation. Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me - with the approval of Reichleiter Rosenberg.++ On the grounds of the Fuehrer's discussion with Quisling and Hagelin on the afternoon of 14.12.39. the Fuehrer gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be made by Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Until that moment, the Naval War Staff had taken no part in the development of the Norwegian question, and, continued to be somewhat sceptical about it. The preparations, which were undertaken by Captain Kranke in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, were founded, however, on a memorandum of the Naval War Staff.

+ With the help of Rear Admiral v. Puttkamer, these may possibly still be obtainable; I had no duplicate as I did not think I should have to give the notes up.

++ At the crucial moment, R. hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of 14.12.

10th November 1945.

I, Kenneth Hugh Molesworth Duke, Major R.A., herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-66.

'SGD' KENNETH HUGH MOLESWORTH DUKE
Major R.A.

Exhibit G.B. 90
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

H1152 - 0039

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C115
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

(SEC - 24.6/C-115)

NAVAL DECEPTION AND CAMOUFLAGE
IN THE INVASION OF NORWAY.

The following extracts are taken from a file of naval operation orders for Operation "Weserübung". (the invasion of Norway.)

1. Page 6. 4.4.40

.....V. General Orders:

(a) The Sperrbreechers (Translators Note: barrage breaking vessels) will penetrate inconspicuously and with lights on into Oslo Fiord disguised as merchant steamers.

(b) Challenge from coastal signal stations and lookouts are to be answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers. I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the operation before zero-hour.

2. Page 84. 24.3.40. Orders for reconnaissance Forces.

.....XI. Behaviour during entrance into the harbour.

All ships darkened, lights to be put on only by order of the Flag Officer Reconnaissance Forces by V.H.F.....

No personnel on deck except gun crews and other upper deck action stations. All army troops below deck.

The disguise as British craft must be kept us as long as possible. All challenges in morse by Norwegian ships will be answered in English. In answer to questions a text with something like the following content will be chosen:

"Calling at Bergen for a short visit, no hostile intent".

Challenges to be answered with names of British Warships:

"Kooln"	-	H.M.S. "Cairo"
"Koenigsberg"	-	H.M.S. "Calcutta"
"Bromso"	-	H.M.S. "Faulkner"
"Karl Peters"	-	H.M.S. "Halcyon"
"Leopard"	-	British Destroyer
"Wolf"	-	" "
E-Boats	-	British motor torpedo boats.

(SEC-24.5/C 115)

Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke.

3. Page 106. 24.3.40. Annexe 3 to Flag Officer Reconnaisance Forces Most Secret 110/40 SO only Copy number 2(

Prepared Signals Group III for possible traffic with passing ships and with Land during entry into Bergen harbour.

H1152-0040

Partial Translation of Document C115
Office of U.S.Chief of Counsel (Con'd.

Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of passing craft.

To challenge:	(in case of the "Koeln")	H.M.S."Cairo"
To order to stop:	(1)	Please repeat last signal.
	(2)	Impossible to understand your signal.
In case of a warning shot:		Stop firing. British ship. Good friend.
In case of an enquiry as to destination and purpose:		Going B ergen. Chasing German steamers.

Certificate of Translation of
Excerpt from C 115

8 November 1945

I, D.E.Sherriff, 2nd Officer, Womens Royal Naval Service, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt of Document C 115.

D.E.Sherriff
2nd Officer,
Womens Royal Naval Service.

2260)

H1152 - 0041

Exhibit GB 82
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

C-122

SEC24/6/C-122

GAINING OF BASES IN NORWAY

3.10.39 (Extract from War Diary)

The Chief of the Naval War Staff considers it necessary that the Führer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving our strategic and operational position. The following questions must be given consideration:

a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?

b) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?

c) What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?

d) Will the harbours have to be developed completely as bases, or have they already advantages suitable for supply position.
(F.O.U-boats already considers such harbours extremely useful as equipment - and supply - bases for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily).

e) What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the War at sea in gaining bases in North Denmark e.g. Skagen?

Translator's note: Chief of Naval War Staff - Raeder.

Exhibit GB 91
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

C 151

Translation of Document No. C 151
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

(SEC24-8/C-151

EXTRACTS FROM THE OPERATION ORDER FOR
OPERATION "HARTMUT"

Commander in Chief of U-Boats,
Operations Department,
B.Nr.Most Secret SC 120

30.3.40
Copy No.1

Top Secret

S. C.

Officer Only.

Operation order 'HARTMUT'

(initialled by Fricke among others)

(II EDITION)

Occupation of Denmark and Norway

This order comes into force on the codeword "Hartmut". With its coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose their validity.

The Day and Hour are designated as "Wesser-Day" and "Weser Hour" and the whole operation is known as "Weserubung".

Situation:

The operation ordered by the codeword has its objective the rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land side.

The primary requisite for success once the landing is accomplished is the hindering of enemy countermeasures, above all of troop landings, until an adequate number of troops has been put ashore. With this object orders have been given for the full commitment of all naval force.....

II (5) The naval force will as they enter the harbour fly the B ritish flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvick.....

(Signed in draft) Doenitz
(Certified) Godt

+Translators' Note: "Toughness"

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO C 151

17.11.45

I, ENID M.STANDRING, P.C.52012, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages: and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C 151.

ENID M STANDRING,
P.C.
52012

2256)

H1152 - 0042

Exhibit G.B. 89
Filed Dec. 7, 1945
C-174

SEC-24.10/C-174

TRANSLATION

Berlin, 1.3.1940

The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces
WFA/Ab t. L. Nr. 22070/40 C.Kdos. Chefs

9 Copies

3rd Copy

Most Secret.

TOP SECRET
By Officer only

Directive for "Fall Weserubung" +

1.) The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces ("Fall Weserubung"). This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic. Further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain. The part which the Navy and the Air Force will play, within the limits of their capabilities, is to protect the operation against the interference of British naval and air striking forces.

In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the "Fall Weseruebung" will be kept as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force, will provide the necessary emphasis. If in spite of this resistance should be met with, all military means will be used to crush it.

Translator's Notes:

+ Initialled by Fricke

++ Code name for invasion of Norway and Denmark.

H1152 – 0043

H1152 -0044

2.) I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of the XXI Army Corps, General d. I. + v. Falkenhorst (Commander of "Group XXI").

In questions of the conduct of operations the above named is directly under my orders. The Staff is to be completed from all the three branches of the Armed Forces.

The force which will be selected for the purpose of "Fall Weser uebung" will be under separate command. They will not be allocated for other operational theatres.

The part of the Air Force detailed for the purpose of the "Weseruebung" will be tactically under the orders of Group XXI. After the completion of their task they revert to the command of Ob.d.L. ++

The employment of the forces which are under direct Naval and Air Force command will take place in agreement with the Commander of Group XXI.

The administration and supply of the forces posted to Group XXI will be ensured by the branches of the Armed Forces themselves according to the demands of the Commander.

3.). The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously. I emphasise that the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy seizes the iniative against Norway, we must be able to apply immediately our own counter-measures.

It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor in mind.

In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives. The troops may be acquainted with the actual objectives only after putting to sea.

Translator's Notes :

\+ der Infanterie = of the Infantry

++ Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

H1152 - 0045

4.) Occupation of Denmark ("Weseruebung Süd").

The Task of Group XXI : Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of Fuenen immediately after occupation of Seeland.

Added to this, having secured the most important places, the Group will break through as quickly as possible from Fuenen to Skagen and to the east coast. In Seeland bases will be captured early on. These will serve as starting points for later occupation. The Navy will provide forces for the securing of the connection Nyborg - Korsor and for swift capture of the Kleine - Belt - Bridge as well as for landing of troops should the necessity arise. She will also prepare the defence of the coast.

The Air-Force will provide squadrons of which the primary object will be demonstrations and dropping of leaflets. Full use of the existing Danish ground defences and air defence must be ensured.

5.) Occupation of Norway ("Weseruebung Nord")

The Task of the Group XXI : Capture by surprise of the most important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.

The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the transport by sea of the landing troops as well as the transport of the forces which will have to be brought to Oslo in a later stage of the operation. She will escort supplies and reserves on the way over by sea.

Preparations must be made for speedy completion of coastal defence in Norway.

The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will ensure air defence and will make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain.

6.) Group XXI will make regular reports to the OKW concerning the state of preparations and will submit a chronological summary of the progress of preparations. The shortest necessary space of time between the issue of the order for "Weseruebung" and its execution must be reported.

Intended Battle Headquarters will be reported.

Code names: Wesertag = the day of the operation.

Weserzeit = "H" hour.

(signed) A. Hitler.

H1152 - 0046

SEC-24.10/C-174.

Distribution:

O.C. Group XXI	Copy No. 1.
C.in C. Army	" " 2.
C.in C. Navy	" " 3.
C.in C. Air Force	" " 4.
Supreme Command Armed Forces	
Head W.F.A. @	" " 5.
L. Section	" Nos. 6 - 9

@ Wehrmachtsführungsamt = operational H.Q. Armed Forces.

Exhibit G.B. 95

Filed Dec. 7, 1945

D 627

Extracts from a despatch from the British Minister in Copenhagen to the Foreign Secretary.

FN 5040/5040/157

Mr. Howard Smith to Viscount Halifax.

Foreign Office, April 25, 1940.

My Lord, ...

The actual events of the 9th April have been pieced together by members of my staff from actual eye-witness or from reliable information subsequently received and are given below. Early in the morning towards 5 o'clock three small German transports steamed into the approach to Copenhagen harbour, whilst a number of aeroplanes circled overhead. The northern battery, guarding the harbour approach, fired a warning shot at these planes when it was seen that they carried German markings. Apart from this, the Danes offered no further resistance, and the German vessels fastened alongside the quays in the Free Harbour. Some of these aeroplanes proceeded to drop leaflets over the town urging the population to keep calm and co-operate with the Germans. I enclose a specimen of this leaflet, which is written in a bastard Norwegian-Danish, a curiously un-German disregard of detail, together with a translation. Approximately 800 soldiers landed with full equipment, and marched to Kastellet, the old fortress of Copenhagen and now a barracks. The door was locked, so the Germans promptly burst it open with explosives, and rounded up all the Danish soldiers within, together with the womenfolk employed in the mess. The garrison offered no resistance, and it appears that they were taken completely by surprise. One officer tried to escape in a motor car, but his chauffeur was shot before they could get away. He died in hospital two days later. After seizing the barracks, a detachment was sent to Amalienborg, the King's palace, where they engaged the Danish sentries on guard, wounding three, one of them fatally..... Meanwhile, a large fleet of bombers flew over the city at low altitudes and surveyed the aerodromes of Kastrup and Vaerlose. Kastrup, the civil port, was quite undefended, and the Germans landed several transports there, containing mostly staff officers and other officials. At Vaerlose, the military station, a number of Danish planes were assembled on the field. Two of these attempted to take off, but were shot down immediately. Shortly afterwards the Germans dropped a number of incendiary bombs and destroyed the hangars and aircraft. By 5 o'clock in the morning the Germans had control of all points of strategic value, and were rapidly consolidating their positions..... Meanwhile, other troops had been landed at Gedser and Korsor. These proceeded rapidly northwards. Subsequently, a shore battery was erected at Kalundborg, and Roskilde was placed under martial law..... A large force was sent up to Helsingor and sentries were posted along the coast facing Sweden.....

It has been difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred in Jutland..... It is clear, however, that the enemy invaded Jutland from the south at dawn on the 9th April and were at first resisted by the Danish forces, who suffered casualties..... The chances of resistance were weakened by the extent to which the forces appear to have been taken by surprise. The chief permanent official of the Ministry of War, for instance, motored into Copenhagen on the morning of the 9th April and drove blithely past a sentry, who challenged him, in blissful ignorance that this was not one of his own men. It took a bullet, which passed through the lapels of his coat, to disillusion him.

H1152 - 0048
Exhibit JB 94
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

Extracts from Memorandum concerning Germany's attitude towards Denmark before and during the occupation, prepared by the Royal Danish Government.

"On the 9th of April, 1940 at 4.20 hours the German Minister appeared at the private residence of the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air Attache of the Legation. The appointment had been made by a telephone call from the German Legation to the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 4 o'clock the same morning. The Minister said at once that Germany had positive proofs that Great Britain intended to occupy bases in Denmark and Norway. Germany had to safeguard Denmark against this. For this reason German soldiers were now crossing the frontier and landing at various points in Zealand including the port of Copenhagen; in a short time German bombers would be over Copenhagen; their orders were not to bomb until further notice. It was now up to the Danes to prevent resistance as any resistance would have the most terrible consequences. Germany would guarantee Denmark territorial integrity and political independence. Germany would not interfere with the internal government of Denmark, but wanted only to make sure of the neutrality of the country. For this purpose the presence of the German Wehrmacht in Denmark was required during the war."

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was completely without foundation; there was no possibility of anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested against the violation of Denmark's neutrality which according to the German Minister's statement was in progress. The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could not give a reply to the demands, which had to be submitted to the King and the Prime Minister, and further observed that the German Minister knew, as everybody else, that the Danish armed forces had order to oppose violations of Denmarks neutrality so that fighting presumably already took place. In reply the German Minister expressed that the matter was very urgent, not least to avoid air bombardment."

Exhibit G. B. 84
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 007 - PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

BRIEF REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAU OF THE PARTY (AUSSENPOLITISCHES AMT DER NSDAP FROM 1933 TO 1943

When the Foreign Affairs Bureau (AUSSENPOLITISCHES AMT) was established 1 April 1933 the Fuhrer directed that it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency, but should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and suggestions.

Corresponding to the extra-ordinarily hostile attitude adopted by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning the newly-established bureau devoted particular attention to internal conditions in the Soviet Union, as well as to the effects of World Bolchevism primarily in other European countries. It entered into contact with the most variegated groups inclining towards National Socialism and combating Bolshevism, focussing its main attention on Nations and States bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand those nations and states constituted an Insulating Ring encircling the Bolshevist neighbour; on the other hand they were the lateral of German living space (Fluegelstellung zum deutschen Lebensraum) and took up a flanking position towards the West Powers (FLANKENSTELLUNG GEGENUEBER DEN WESTTAECHTEN) especially Great Britain. In order to wield the desired influence by one means or another, the Bureau was compelled to use the most varying methods, taking into consideration the completely different living conditions, the ties of blood, intellect and history of the movements observed by the Bureau in those countries.

In Scandinavia an outspokenly pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude, based on economic considerations, had become progressively more dominant after the World War of 1914/18. There the Bureau put the entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic Society (NORDISCHE GESELLSCHAFT) in Luebeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of this society were attended by many outstanding personalities, especially from Finnland. While there were no openings for purely political co-operation in Sweden and Denmark, an association based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very close relations were established with its founder, which led to further consequences (See annex I for more detailed exposition).

South Eastern Europe was dominated by the French post-war system of alliances. The countries united in the Little Entente were aiming at a more favourable defence of the booty accummulated during the war. In addition each one of these countries sought to gain through this mutual-assistance pact safety against a superior opponent; Czechoslovakia against Germany; Yugoslavia against Italy; Rumania against the Soviet Union. In Czechoslovakia a common hatred against everything German united the still remaining, partly pan-Slavic, Masonic and pro-Jewish tendencies. In Rumania the feeling of insecurity and four of the superior neighbour, from whom she had taken Besarabia was growing. In Rumania a primitive anti-Semitic group still existed. Its academically doctrinaire attitude precluded large scale political affectiveness, but nevertheless offered points of mutual interest. The Foreign Affairs Bureau picked those up, developed them instigated the formation of a new party and thereby forced a decisive change in the whole political situation in Rumania, which is still having its effect today. (See Annex II for more detailed exposition).

H1152 - 0049

Hungary and Bulgaria alone, Allied nations of the World War which had formerly been completely deprived of their rights were attracted by the newly-formed centre of gravity in the north. This attraction was nourished by the hope of obtaining an expansion of their own power through the increasing strength of Germany. However, National-Socialism met a certain reserve or antipathy in Bulgaria because of widespread contagion of the Communistic blight. In Hungary it met similar reserve due to the still fashionable feudal leading circles, who are bolstered by Jewish capital. At any rate it may be mentioned here that the first foreign state visit after the seizure of power took place through the mediation of the Foreign Affairs Bureau Julius Gombos, who in former years had himself pursued anti-Semitic and racial tendencies, had reached the Hungarian Premier's chair. The Bureau maintained a personal connection with him. In September 1933 he paid a visit to Germany and was received by the Fuhrer in Erfurt. With this visit the official cordon of isolation surrounding National-Socialism was pierced for the first time. This visit had been preceded by the Fuhrer's reception of the Rumanian poet and former minister Octavian Goga through the Bureau's mediation. Goga later became the decisive exponent of a political reproachment with Germany.

In Yugoslavia other German Reich agencies had become active in the same direction, so that the Foreign Affairs Bureau remained in the background and shifted its efforts to the purely commercial sphere. It initiated the first contract with Croatian and Serbian co-operatives.

Motivated by reasons of War Economy, the Bureau advocated the transfer of raw material purchases from overseas to the areas accessible by overland traffic routes, i.e. primarily in the Balkans, naturally insofar as practicable. At first little heed was paid to the Bureau in these endeavours, but it later secured the active support especially of the Food Estate (NAEHRSTAND) through its co-operation, e.g. on the subject of fruit and vegetable imports, a very substantial shift in the source of imports was attained, particularly through the currently initiated co-operation with Croatian and Hungarian co-operatives as well as with commercial associations all over the Balkans.

From the beginning work in Italy was out of the question because ever since the days of our struggle for power ties of a personal nature have existed, which were taken over by official institutions or cultivated by individual personalities. Work in Austria was also excluded, since a special "Provincial Directorate for Austria" existed within the Nazi Party (NSDAP).

The Bureau declined to concern itself with questions of Racial Germans (VOLKSDEUTSCHE) abroad. For this phase of the problem the "Racia Germans" Central Agency (VOLKSDEUTSCHE MITTELSTELLE) was later created.

Towards Eastern European States the Bureau limited its activities to simple observation of existing conditions, or to the establishment of relations, especially of a commercial nature, primarily in Belgium Holland and Luxemburg.

In accordance with the attitude on foreign police laid down by the Fuhrer, the Bureau endeavoured to establish far-reaching connections with England through continuous personal contacts with influential personalities of English political life. Eminent Englishmen were invited to the annual Party [illegible]

Pursuant to its self-chosen task the Bureau devoted its attention to the Near East. Turkey, now consolidated by Mustapha Kemal, adopted a hesitant attitude of watchful waiting. [illegible]

1187)

H1152 – 0050

H1152 - 0051

position was probably due to military impotence against Soviet Russia, clearly recognised, on the one hand, and also to hostility to Fascist Italy, already previously manifested, on the other hand. In Iran, however, the Bureau's initiative in the economic field to stimulate the mutual exchange of goods encountered greatest understanding and the greatest readiness in carrying it through. The Bureau's initiative in developing with the head of commercial circles, entirely new methods for the economic penetration of Iran found expression, in an extraordinarily favourable way, in reciprocal trade relations. Naturally in Germany, too, this initiative at first encountered a completely negative attitude and resistance on the part of the competent state authorities, an attitude that had first to be overcome. In the course of a few years the volume of trade with Iran was multiplied five-fold, and in 1938 Iran's trade turnover with Germany had obtained first place. Even Soviet Russia, the competitor who had been biggest and most dreaded previously, had been eliminated from the running. Concurrently with the activation of commercial relations the Bureau had also intensified cultural relations and had, in conjunction with growing commercial influence and in closest collaboration with the Iranian Government, created a series of cultural institutions headed and directed by Germans. In consequence the dominant French cultural influence in Iran has already been broken since the year 1936.

The Bureau simultaneously attempted to also draw Afghanistan into its orbit. Relations established with leading individual personalities led to the willing opening of this country, which had formerly been rather neglected by Germany. All the leading personalities of Afghanistan were guests of the Bureau. The Bureau favoured the taking part of German economy in the industrial upbuilding of the country; German exports in all fields were called to Afghanistan in increasing numbers through the Bureau's mediation. The German Colony became the dominant one in Afghanistan. The preparation for expansion of the Afghan army was in German hands; carrying it through was prevented by the outbreak of War. Even though the German Colony had to leave Afghanistan later on. Afghanistan's neutral position today is largely due to the Bureau's activity.

The Arab question, too, became part of the work of the Bureau. In spite of England's tutelage of Iraq the Bureau established a series of connections to a number of leading personalities of the Arab World, smoothing the way for strong bonds to Germany. In this connection, the growing influence of the Reich in Iran and Afghanistan did not fail to have repercussions in Arabia. All these relations took place on a purely economic basis and fostered the systematically direct advancement of German influence and prestige in the domains reserved by the Western Powers for themselves. In this connection it may be mentioned in general that the internal peril to England's preponderance in those areas would have been considerably more pronounced, if the Bureau's foresighted initiative, which took Oriental conditions very well into account, had not been forever ignored by official authorities.

The Bureau foresaw the necessity of technical improvement of the Danube water route to facilitate traffic, because of the shift in the increase of the exchange of goods, especially in the Balkans and in the Orient. On its own initiative it attempted to influence competent authorities (especially of the Bavarian Government), together with particularly interested private commercial circles, to enlarge our Danube shipping facilities (primarily the port of Regensburg). Although the Bureau throughout the years, asserted this necessity, which was becoming more and more urgent, and although the Bureau relentlessly maintained its initiative, its endeavours in this matter were

38)

H1152 - 0052

Translation of Document 007 PS
(Continued)

unfortunately not crowned by any success. Presumably all responsible authorities regret it bitterly today.

Among other projects due to the Foreign Affairs Bureau's initiative, endeavours to grow the rubber-[illegible] KOK SAGYS plant in Germany deserve to be emphasized. This plant is [illegible]ted in the Soviet Union. In spite of efforts during many years, no success was attained in planting sizeable exp[illegible]ental crops, because of latent disunity among competent [illegible]thorities. The Bureau was compelled to resort to experimental fields in Greece through its own connections in the Balkans.

Somewhat off the beaten path was the Bureau's undertaking in Brazil, which grew out of personal connections. Large quantities of cotton (60000 tons) were successfully brought to Germany under a clearing agreement at a time when imports of this raw material had become very critically short, already necessitating work cuts. A bureau's representative was twice the Brazilian Government's guest! Brazil and Iran were the only nations from whom Germany could purchase this indispensable raw material for Reichsmark. The Brazilian Minister expressed his thanks for this initial step to the Head of the Bureau in an address delivered at the occasion of an exposition.

About 40 lecture evenings for diplomats and the foreign press should also be listed. They dealt with the construction of the new Germany, and speakers included many leading personalities of the Reich.

The bureau has carried out the initiating of all politically feasible projects. With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connections in many lands can be resumed under a different guise.

(Signed) ROSENBURG

2 Enclosures
I Norway
II Rumania

1870)

H1152 – 0053

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 007-PS
(Cont'd.)

ANNEX I to Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party (AUSSENPOLITISCHES AMT DER NSDAP) From 1933 to 1943.

The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway During the War Years 1939/1940.

As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in Scandinavia only "Nasjonal Samling", led in Norway by the Former Minister of War and Major of the Reserve Vidkun Quisling, deserved serious political attention. This was a fighting political group, possessed by the idea of a Greater Germanic Community. Naturally all ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent, by any means, its success among the population. The Bureau maintained constant liaison with Quisling and attentively observed the attacks he conducted with tenacious energy on the middle class which had been taken in tow by the English. From the beginning it appeared probable that without revolutionary events, which would stir the population from their former attitude no successful progress of Nasjonal Samling was to be expected. During the winter 1938/1939, Quisling was privately visited by a member of the Bureau. When the political situation in Europe came to a head in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the convention of the Nordic Society (NORDISCHE GESELLSCHAFT) in Luebeck in June. He expounded his conception of the situation, and his apprehensions concerning Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically decisive importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area, and to the advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between the Greater German Reich and Great Britain. Assuming that his statements would be of special interest to the Marshal of the Reich Goering for aero-strategical reasons, Quisling was referred to State Secretary (STAATSSEKRETAER) Koerner by the Bureau. The Staff Director (STABSLEITER) of the Bureau handed the Chief of the Reich Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Fuhrer. It dealt with the same subject, still taking into account the then doubtful attitude of Soviet Russia. After the outbreak of German-Polish hostilities and of the Soviet-Finnish war, tensions in Scandinavia became more strained and facilitated the work of Anglo-Saxon propaganda. It began to appear possible that, under the pretext of altruistic aid to Finland, Great Britain might intend to occupy Norway, and perhaps Sweden, to complete the anti-German blockade in the North Sea for all practical purposes, and to gain comfortable airplane bases against Germany. The aim would have been to drag the Northern countries, too, into a military conflict with Germany. Apprehensive about this development, Quisling again appeared in Berlin in December, 1939. He visited Reichsleiter Rosenberg and Grand Admiral Raeder. In the course of a report to the Fuhrer, Reichsleiter Rosenberg turned the conversation once more to Norway. He especially pointed to Norway's importance should England, to tighten her blockade and under the pretext of aid to Finland, take steps to occupy the country, with the Norwegians; tacit consent. On the basis of his conversation with Quisling and at his own request, Grand Admiral Raeder, too, had been asked to see the Fuhrer. In consequence of these steps Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Fuhrer on 16 December, and once more on 18 December. In the course of this audience the Fuhrer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway as well as of the whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theatre of war and to draw still other nations into the conflict. Should the enemy attempt to spend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further throttling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity, the promised Quisling financial support of his movement, which is based on Greater Germanic ideology. Military exploitation of the question now raised was assigned

H1152-0054

the special Military Staff, which transmitted special missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political exploitation. Financial expences were to be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (AUSWAERTIGES AMT), the Minister for Foreign Affairs being kept continuously by the Foreign Affairs Bureau.

Chief of Section (AMTSLEITER) Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was assigned to the Naval Attache in Oslo, Lt. Commander (KORVETTENKAPITAEN) Schreiber. Orders were given that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy.

Quisling's reports, transmitted through his representative in Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of intervention by the Western Powers in Norway with tacit consent of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by January already. These increasingly better substantiated communications were in sharpest contrast to the view of the German Legation in Oslo, which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian Nygardszvold cabinet and was convinced of that government's intention and readiness to defend Norway's neutrality. No one in Norway knew that Quisling's representative for Germany maintained closest relations to him; he therefore succeeded in gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the Nygardsvold cabinet and in listening to cabinet member's true views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the Bureau, which conveyed the news to the Fuhrer through REICHSLEITER Rosenburg. During the night of 16 to 17 February English destroyers attacked the German steamer "Altmark" in Jossingfjord. The Norwegian Government's reaction to this question permitted the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived at between the Norwegian government and the Allies. Such assumption was confirmed by reports of Section (AMTSLEITER) Scheidt who in turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even after this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the opposite view, and went on record as believing in the good intentions of the Norwegians.

Thanks to his connections in Norway as agent of the Norwegian Navy, Hagelin had succeeded, in the meantime, in being entrusted with the purchase of German AA guns through the German Navy Ministry. Through these connections he gained more and more insight into the real views and intentions of the Norwegian Nygardsvoid cabinet, and into the preparations already initiated by the Allies in Norway. At the occasion of his presence in Berlin on 20 March to negotiate about delivery of German AA guns he mentioned that the Allies were now even examining Norwegian ports for loading and transportation facilities. The French KOMMANDANT entrusted with this mission was said to have revealed Allied intentions in confidential conversations with the commander of Narvik and adherent of Quisling.

These intentions were to land motorized troops at Stavanger Drontheim and perhaps Kirkenes, and to occupy Sola airdrome near Stavanger. Hagelin also re-emphasized his warnings about agreements secretly concluded between the Allies and the Norwegian government according to which the Norwegian Government would content itself solely with paper protests in case of a possible occupation of port cities by the Allies. He pointed out that the Norwegian Government had never intended to seriously oppose England, and that it was playing a two-faced game with Germany solely to gain time for faits accomplis. He also mentioned that the Norwegian Government had been informed by England that Germany intended to lay a minefield from Jutland to the Norwegian coast. In

H1152 - 0055

view of all the information that had reached him, Quisling could no longer stand by his advice to await developments in Norway for a little while longer; he was compelled to point out that any delay of the German counter-thrust would entail extraordinary risks. These reports were immediately transmitted to the Fuhrer by REICHSLEITER Rosenberg. On 8 April the Allies struck the first blow in preparation for their intended occupation of Norway, thus confirming those reports made by Quisling and his agents, and in contrast to the views held to the end by the German Legation in Oslo and by the export of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (AUSWAERTIGES AMT). During the night from 7 to 8 April minefields were laid alongside the Norwegian coast by the Allied Fleet, and the Allied Governments informed the world of the steps they had taken. In accordance with indications given by the Bureau, only progressively more tepid protests were made by Norway. By order of the Fuhrer, Greater German counter-attacked, after corresponding preparation, in the morning of 9 April and occupied the most important Norwegian sea ports and airdromes.

H1152-0056

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ANNEX II: Rumania (From the overthrow of Titolescu to Marshal Antonescu)

In spite of almost complete occupation by the Central Powers in the last World War, Rumania was indebted to Versailles for her re-creation, which was effected partially even at the expense of her one-time Eastern ally. A basically sound anti-Semitic tendency existed in this post-war country, which was torn asunder by dynastic squabbles and innumerable party fights. But in spite of repeated efforts this tendency had never risen above the limitations of a club, because of solely scientific doctrinaire leadership. What was lacking was the guiding leadership of a political personality. After manifold grouping trials the Bureau believed to have found such a personality -- the former minister and poet, Octavian Goga. It was not difficult to convince this poet, pervaded by instictive inspiration, that a Greater Rumania, though it had to be created in opposition to Vienna, could be maintained only together with Berlin. Nor was it difficult to create in him the desire to link the fate of Rumania with the future of the National Socialist German Reich in good time. By bringing continuing influence to bear, the Bureau succeeded in inducing Octavian Goga as well as Professor Cuza to amalgamate the parties under the leadership on an Anti-Semitic basis. Thus they could carry on with united strength the struggle for Rumania's renascence internally, and her affiliation (ANSCHLUSS) with Germany externally. Through the Bureau's initiative both parties, which had heretofore been known by distinct names, were merged as the National-Christian Party, under Goga's leadership and with Cuza as Honorary President. The attempts concurrently undertaken by the Bureau to amalgamate this Party with the much more youthful, but energetic Iron Guard movement were initially frustrated by the apparently insurmountable personal incompatibility of Cuza and Codreanu. At any rate these attempts led to the secret establishment of good personal relations between Goga and the mystic fanciful Codreanu.

In the course of the years after his return, the king had succeeded in becoming the country's decisive factor through crafty tactics in dealing with the dominant political parties. Had the Bureau also succeeded in merging the National-Christian Party with Codreanu, Rumania would have obtained sharply anti-Semitic leadership based on strong mass support. Such leadership should have attained its aims even against the will of the king. However, surviving rivalries between the country's anti-Semitic trends later enabled the king to use them separately for his plans in order to destroy them as far as possible.

The struggle for re-orientation of Rumania's foreign policy was taken up by Goga with bold elan. He had earlier succeeded in upsetting the position of Foreign Minister Titulescu, the agent of France, of the Geneva League of Nations and of the Little Entente. Titulescu was later overthrown. Among the numerous, not very significant splinter parties, the "Young Liberals", founded by George Bratianu, supported Goga's campaign, without joining the anti-Semitic trend. The Rumanian front of Vaida Voevod wobbling to and fro among all camps, adopted a similar position for some time. Through intermediaries, the Bureau maintained constant contact with both tendencies, just like it constantly consulted with Goga, through Staff Director (STABSLEITER) Schickedanz, about tactics to be followed. The whole struggle was accelerated by Soviet Russia's increasing pressure in the Bessarabian question, by the process of political rapprochement with Moscow, which was supported by Paris and Prague. Following a long period of recurring political trials involving scandal and graft Rumania's internal struggle for the future make-up of the country, had been aggravated by the coming to the front of the Christian-Nationalist Party and of the Iron Guard. This struggle was being fought with increasing bitterness. The king's attitude towards the national movement was procrastinating and underhanded. The movement was agreeable to him for eliminating the two parties which, by tradition, took turns in the government. But he intended to prevent the unequivocal victory of anti-Semitic and racial (VOELKISCH) principles, influenced by growing Nationalism, in the country. That is why the Nationalists' foreign policy, secretly

H1152 - 0057

projected by Germany, did not fit into his plans. Because he was in possession of the police and of the army, he remained the decisive factor in the country. After repeated postponement of the elections which were legally due, the king decided to hold an election. The decision was based on a very reliable report of his then Prime Minister Tatarescu was convinced that the Liberal Party would again receive 40% of all votes, through the machinations customary in Ro However, after a bitter election campaign the Liberal Party suffered painful defeat. The opposition National Movement had achieved indisputable victory in spite of all chicanery and machinations by their opponents. The Iron Guard received about 16% of the total vote, the National-Christian Party Goga-Cuza about 11%, the government party about 35%. The rest of the votes were scattered. After some vacillation and hesitancy, the king appointed Goga Prime Minister on 27 December 1937 with a binding promise that Parliament would be dismissed and new elections held within the legally prescribed time limits. In spite of warnings by the Bureau Goga believed the promise given by the king. But the king was only attempting to gain time.

Thus a second government on racial (VOELKISCH) and anti-Semitic foundations had appeared in Europe, in a country in which such an event had been considered completely impossible. The government immediately made known its intention to proceed against Jewish predominance in the country and declared repeatedly that it would have to subject Rumania's previous foreign policy to re-examination and reform. In the meantime the Judaic-Masonic and liberal opposition did not lose time. Passions were inflamed and became increasingly more envenomed. It looked like a hot and bloody election campaign. The prospects of Goga's Christian-Nationalist Party pointed to a big victory with sure certainty, especially since, with the Bureau's cooperation he had made a secret agreement with Codreanu. To be sure, Goga did not act on the Bureau's advice to develop immediately his party cadres, to expand his party machine all over the country and to permeate the police and gendarmerie. Goga postponed the execution of organizational reform, which he also intended, until after the election. He considered himself to be under obligation to the king not to undertake anything until the electoral decisions had been rendered, but to take steps all the more incisively after legally attaining the majority. In innumerable interviews the opposition must have succeeded in convincing the king that an electoral victory of Goga would react most acutely against the king himself. In that case he would no longer be able to get rid of the ghosts he had called in; if Goga attained a two-thirds majority, he, the king, would be Goga's captive. These expostulations, and the uncontrollable Judaic influences of the Jewish clique at the Rumanian court, plus the pressure of the French and British Ministers led to a change in the king's attidue, assuming that this change had not already been anticipated by him at the time of Goga's appointment. The King decided to prevent the elections. Goga resisted. Thereupon the king offered Goga the formation of an authoritarian government, i.e., a government created solely by virtue of royal sovereignty. That meant a coup d'etat. Goga declined. Thereupon the king informed Goga that he would accept the cabinet's resignation, which, however, had not even been offered to him. Goga realized too late that the strength at his disposal was entirely inadequate to thwart the king's plans. He resigned.

But the course once embarked upon forced even the king to pay heed to the mood that had been created in the country. Also, a return to the disrupted foreign-policy ties was no longer possible. Although an authoritarian system had been built up, Rumania found herself without her former backing. The French security system had been ruptured and could not be re-established, if only in view of Yugoslavia's attitude in the South-East, where relations established by other German agencies had simultaneously loosened the cohesive ties of the Little Entente. That, at any rate, was the Goga government's success.

H1152 - 0058

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 007-PS
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In his last great speech to the Rumanian Academy, shortly before his death, Goga welcomed Austria's affiliation with Germany and affirmed for the last time his belief in adherence to new Greater German Reich and to Fascist Italy, a belief he had struggled for.

Now the king's war of extermination against the Iron Guard began. Codreanu was arrested with his closest collaborators, to face a specially convoked court-martial. Sole basis for the prosecution was an alleged communication from Codreanu to the Fuhrer, which was proved to be a forgery, and a telegram addressed to the Fuhrer. On the basis of these "records" he was sentenced to ten years hard labour. In vain did the Bureau attempt to bring about an intervention of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (AUSWERTIGES AMT) in this episode, which diminished the whole prestige of the German Reich. It did not prevail against the official agencies, which condemned the entire project of the Bureau in Rumania, because the official German delegation expected their sole salvation from the attitude of the King and his creatures. Logically, the acceptance without dissent of this challenge was interpreted in Bucharest as granting carte blanche and Codreano was shot with his closest collaborators establishment of the first personal contact between the King and the Fuhrer.

This appeared to doom the Iron Guard, too, Goga's party, deprived of his leadership, was submerged into insignificance. But Goga left behind a personal heir, who is now Mashal Antonescu. Against the king's wish, Goga had appointed this politically insignificant provincial general, with whom the king was on bad terms, as his Minister of War. At first completely pro French in outlook, Antonescu gradually adopted a different view under Goga's influence. After Goga's resignation, Antonescu still remained in the king's cabinet at Goga's wish. He also maintained continued relations with the Iron Guard. Thereby the possibility of eliminating the king was at hand - and was exploited, Antonescu' today appears in practice as executor of the heritage bequeathed to him by Goga, who had led him from political insignificance into the political arena. Thereby a change to Germany's liking had become possible in Rumania.

(Signed) Rosenberg.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 007-PS

I/FRED NIEBERGALL/2nd Lt. Inf. O-135537/ hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 007 PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf
O-1335567

H1152 - 0059

PARTIAL
TRNSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.1546-PS
OFFICE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

N. THE OCCUPATION OF NORWAY ON 9 APRIL 1940

(Page 2)

In the beginning of October 1939, I had a discussion on the Norwegian question with the Commander of Naval Group East, Admiral Carls, with whose opinions I completely agreed. After that I gave the Fuhrer an oral report on the dangers of an occupation of Norwegian bases by the British and on the possibilities to forestall such a move. The Fuhrer to whom I submitted a short memorandum promised to think it over. About at the beginning of December, the Fuhrer received reports on the activity of the National Samling movement in Norway under the leadership of Quisling and its successes. The incorporation of Norway into a Germanic empire under German leadership and with elimination of English influence was the aim of this movement. These matters were obviously carried to the Fuhrer by Rosenberg. Around the 12 Dec. 1939 the Fuhrer commanded the OKW to effect the preparations for the occupation of Norwegian bases in the coming spring. As it was a question of an operation of all three branches of the Armed Forces it had to be worked out by the Armed Forces High Command in which the special Naval adviser (Referent) took the chief part and took the lead in working it out in accordance with a memorandum prepared by the Sea Warfare Command and in close co-operation with the Sea Warfare Command.

I had left the Danish Question open in my report to the Fuhrer supposing that after the occupation of the Norwegian coast the English influence in Denmark could be completely eliminated in such wise that the intelligence service there could not cause any more harm and the Danish Government would comply with the demands of the German High Command without function. However, the Fuhrer decided to occupy Denmark at the same time.

The Navy made the decision to transport the first group of the occupation troops with their equipment on warships and to land them under their immediate protection. Even though the combat-readiness of the warships was impaired by loading them with troops, by this method the possibility of a punctual landing at the ordered time was best provided for. Further groups with munition and supplies were to be loaded on steamships which were to arrive simultaneously or soon after the warships. The difficulty was that at that time the divisions of the army still demanded to be transported with all equipment and "rear echelon service" while a considerable limitation of their equipment would have been necessary and possible. Considerable demands of transport space were made by the Air Forces for their ground organization for which no experience existed at all up till then. The Navy had already in peacetime an organization of "Naval Service Offices" in all large German ports which worked in close touch with the Merchant Marine and were at all times exactly informed of the location and the readiness for sailing of the German merchant ships of their area. Material for the rebuilding of these ships for transport purposes was atheir disposal, plans for such rebuilding were ready in their hands. In January these offices received directives to have the necessary transport space ready in spring. A transport in a westerly direction was given as the reason for camouflage purposes. The Air Force did not join this organization that also was very favourable for secrecy, but gave the order for their extensive transports to a certain firm with which it had already cooperated at the time of the transports to Spain. This included certain dangers for secrecy and eliminated the experience of the Navy, Moreover, the command of the Air Force did not approach with particular enthusiasm this task in the work of which not the Air Force, but the not so well liked Navy, had the leading part. In the Navy the impression existed that some things could have been better done with regard to the reconnaissance of airfields in Norway and to the preparations for the improvement and the building of airfields.

H1152 - 0060

The preparations for the enterprise were rendered more difficult by the long and very cold winter of 1939/40 which delayed quite a bit the bringing up of the steamers involved in the transport from the eastern part of the Baltic Sea and their loading. With all the effort to forestall the English in the occupation - their unneutral action against the German supply ship in Flekkefjord in 1940 made the apprehension of the German Command appear only too well founded - the date for the landing was fixed by the Fuhrer not earlier than on April 9, 1940 in which regard it could not be helped that according to the latest information received the English planned an enterprise in Norwegian waters for April 8 - it remained open whether mine-laying or occupation of air bases. My request to fix the landing on April 7 was unfortunately not granted by the Fuhrer.

The general order for the execution of the landing was signed by the Fuehrer; detailed directives valid for all armed forces were given by the High Command in which, as already mentioned, the special Navy adviser took the lead. The ports of embarkation were distributed from Wesermmende to Stettin-Swinenmende along the coast. The transportation of the troops to the ports was undertaken only in the last hours before departure without their knowing where they were being transported. It was particularly difficult for the keeping of the secret that for the enterprise in Northern Norway some units of Southern German mountain troops were destined whose appearance in Northern Germany was already conscious enough by itself. But we succeeded in keeping them uncertain about the destination until to their complete surprise, they were embarked on the destroyers in Wesemmende in the night of April 7. The number of the Army and air units I cannot state anymore from memory at present. Also, the composition of the landing troops I can give only in general terms.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1546-PS

16 Nov. 45

I, S/Sgt. Chas. E. Bidwell, 13146054, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 1546-PS.

CHAS. E. BIDWELL.
S/Sgt. 13146054.

H1152 - 0061

PARTIAL
TRNSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.1546-PS
OFFICE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

N. THE OCCUPATION OF NORWAY ON 9 APRIL 1940

(Page 2)

In the beginning of October 1939, I had a discussion on the Norwegian question with the Commander of Naval Group East, Admiral Carls, with whose opinions I completely agreed. After that I gave the Fuhrer an oral report on the dangers of an occupation of Norwegian bases by the British and on the possibilities to forestall such a move. The Fuhrer to whom I submitted a short memorandum promised to think it over. About at the beginning of December, the Fuhrer received reports on the activity of the National Samling movement in Norway under the leadership of Quisling and its successes. The incorporation of Norway into a Germanic empire under German leadership and with elimination of English influence was the aim of this movement. These matters were obviously carried to the Fuhrer by Rosenberg. Around the 12 Dec. 1939 the Fuhrer commanded the OKW to effect the preparations for the occupation of Norwegian bases in the coming spring. As it was a question of an operation of all three branches of the Armed Forces it had to be worked out by the Armed Forces High Command in which the special Naval adviser (Referent) took the chief part and took the lead in working it out in accordance with a memorandum prepared by the Sea Warfare Command and in close co-operation with the Sea Warfare Command.

I had left the Danish Question open in my report to the Fuhrer supposing that after the occupation of the Norwegian coast the English influence in Denmark could be completely eliminated in such wise that the intelligence service there could not cause any more harm and the Danish Government would comply with the demands of the German High Command without function. However, the Fuhrer decided to occupy Denmark at the same time.

The Navy made the decision to transport the first group of the occupation troops with their equipment on warships and to land them under their immediate protection. Even though the combat-readiness of the warships was impaired by loading them with troops, by this method the possibility of a punctual landing at the ordered time was best provided for. Further groups with munition and supplies were to be loaded on steamships which were to arrive simultaneously or soon after the warships. The difficulty was that at that time the divisions of the army still demanded to be transported with all equipment and "rear echelon service" while a considerable limitation of their equipment would have been necessary and possible. Considerable demands of transport space were made by the Air Forces for their ground organization for which no experience existed at all up till then. The Navy had already in peacetime an organization of "Naval Service Offices" in all large German ports which worked in close touch with the Merchant Marine and were at all times exactly informed of the location and the readiness for sailing of the German merchant ships of their area. Material for the rebuilding of these ships for transport purposes was atheir disposal, plans for such rebuilding were ready in their hands. In January these offices received directives to have the necessary transport space ready in spring. A transport in a westerly direction was given as the reason for camouflage purposes. The Air Force did not join this organization that also was very favourable for secrecy, but gave the order for their extensive transports to a certain firm with which it had already cooperated at the time of the transports to Spain. This included certain dangers for secrecy and eliminated the experience of the Navy, Moreover, the command of the Air Force did not approach with particular enthusiasm this task in the work of which not the Air Force, but the not so well liked Navy, had the leading part. In the Navy the impression existed that some things could have been better done with regard to the reconnaissance of airfields in Norway and to the preparations for the improvement and the building of airfields.

H1152 - 0062

The preparations for the enterprise were rendered more difficult by the long and very cold winter of 1939/40 which delayed quite a bit the bringing up of the steamers involved in the transport from the eastern part of the Baltic Sea and their loading. With all the effort to forestall the English in the occupation - their unneutral action against the German supply ship in Flekkefjord in 1940 made the apprehension of the German Command appear only too well founded - the date for the landing was fixed by the Fuhrer not earlier than on April 9, 1940 in which regard it could not be helped that according to the latest information received the English planned an enterprise in Norwegian waters for April 8 - it remained open whether mine-laying or occupation of air bases. My request to fix the landing on April 7 was unfortunately not granted by the Fuhrer.

The general order for the execution of the landing was signed by the Fuehrer; detailed directives valid for all armed forces were given by the High Command in which, as already mentioned, the special Navy adviser took the lead. The ports of embarkation were distributed from Wesermmende to Stettin-Swinenmende along the coast. The transportation of the troops to the ports was undertaken only in the last hours before departure without their knowing where they were being transported. It was particularly difficult for the keeping of the secret that for the enterprise in Northern Norway some units of Southern German mountain troops were destined whose appearance in Northern Germany was already conscious enough by itself. But we succeeded in keeping them uncertain about the destination until to their complete surprise, they were embarked on the destroyers in Wesermmende in the night of April 7. The number of the Army and air units I cannot state anymore from memory at present. Also, the composition of the landing troops I can give only in general terms.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1546-PS

16 Nov. 45

I, S/Sgt. Chas. E. Bidwell, 13146054, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 1546-PS.

CHAS. E. BIDWELL.
S/Sgt. 13146054.

Translation of Document 1809 PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

Exhibit G.B. 88
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

Copy.

Translations of General Jodl's Diary (Armed Forces Operational Staff) from 1 February to 26 May 1940.

1 February 1940:

The Fuhrer wants Major Kieritz to be sent from here in good time with special mission.

Col. Schmundt and Capt. Deyhle are back from the West.
Results:

1) Morale and discipline - excellent.
2) Tactical mobility is impossible because of the weather. One cannot cover more than 15 km. Army Group B, on the other hand, think the weather excellent for overcoming the difficulty of floods.
3) In all divisions formerly committed in the East, the position with regard to mechanised vehicles is very bad. Up to 40% are lacking. Each of these 40 divisions should be provided with up to 100 vehicles.

1700 hours General Jeschonnek.

1) Behaviour of parachute units. In front of the Hague they have to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute force. The 7th Div. intends to drop units near the town.
2) Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action against the Dutch air force.
3) Walcheren Island will have to be occupied as soon as possible.
4) In case of immediate action, further arrangements required.
To be eliminated:
Commitment of K against Eben Emael against bridge C.
"Fieselor Stork" airplane in front of Army Group A.
The ground forces will take up position during the hours of d arkness, if possible.
7th Air Division is to be in readiness, but will not take up position without further orders.
5) Question about general intentions? Time.
6) Is it not possible to tackle H alone; this would be a tremendous improvement from the point of view of those conducting air operations.
7) The Air Force wants permission to attack every kind of merchant shipping in the 30 mile-zone as well as everything anywhere which is armed: French vessels, transports.

2nd February

Fuhrer is furious about performance by Ordnance Department which needed 8 days to demonstrate to him - not by actual trial but only theoretically - that the Czech 4.7 cm anti-tank gun is not usable with armoured car 3.

Fuhrer decides as to Jeschonnek's questions of 1 February:

a) one has to employ against the Hague (d.H.) forces of such strength that they will be able to take over command there.
In order to achieve this, one of the landings can be made in the centre of the Hague.
Unlimited use of arms against airfields and anti-aircraft guns is authorized.
Relative to an attack against all ships found between the English East Coast and the English mine fields, as desired by the Air Force, the Foreign Office is still to be consulted.
Chief of Home Defence (Chef L. Translator's note: WARLIMONT) also Admiral Schuster) 17.00 hrs) states in this matter that he does not want any exception.

H1152 - 0063

H1152 - 0064

Translation of Document [illegible] -PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

February 5 1940

Special staff "Weser Exercise" meets, is welcomed by Chief of Armed Forces High Command, and given instructions. Still no Air Force Representative.

26th February 1940

Fuhrer raises the question, whether it is better to undertake the Weser Exercise before or after case "Yellow".

Chief of Home Defence (Chef L) charged with examining this problem. Fuhrer decides that Navy will have to wait to commence mine-laying from the air until employment of a large force of planes is possible. (transmitted to Chief of Home Defence.)

3rd March 1940

Fuhrer expresses himself very sharply about the necessity of swift entry into Norway with very strong forces. No delay by branches of Armed Forces. Very rapid acceleration of attack is necessary.

Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force is against any proposition to subordinate Air Force units to 21st Army Corps.

Fuhrer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before case "Yellow", with a few days interval.

H1152-0065

May 8th:

Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs, evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the intelligence service (Abwehrmeldungen) the British have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.

According to reports the measures of the Dutch are partly directed against the coast and partly against us. It is not possible to obtain a clear picture, whether the Dutch don't work hand in hand with the English or whether they really want to defend their neutrality against the first attacker. Evaluation of the weather shows slow improvement of the general situation, but development of fog in the next days must still be reckoned with.

Führer does not want to wait any longer.
Field Marshal wants postponement until the 10th, at least.

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presses for early action. Führer is very agitated; then he consents to postponement until May 10th, which is against his intuition, as he says. But not one day longer.

Departure of Envoy Kiewitz, who was scheduled to leave at 12.57 hours is stopped at the last minute. Is not supposed to leave until May 9th.

In the evening, I agree with him on the various telegrams.

May 9th:

Führer decides that he will definitely make a start on May 10th.
Departure with Führer train at 17.00 hours from Finkenkrug.

After report by Joschonnek that weather situation will be favourable on the 10th, the code word Danzig is given at 21.00 hrs.

The same to Chief of Home Defence (i.e. WARLIMONT)

May 11th - 13th:

The operations take a course favourable beyond expectation. The Dutch offer desperate resistance. Bridges at Maastricht, and all bridges north of it, are blown up. Only the railroad bridge at Gennep falls into our hands undamaged. Fort Eben Emael is taken and the bridges in Mordeyk south of Dortrecht as well as the important ones over the Albert Canal west of Maastricht are taken over by parachutists and glider-borne personnel and are held by them. Airborne operation of the Sponek Division is met by heaviest resistance and is badly mauled. However, the individual units hold out. On the R., the junction of the 9th armoured division with them is effected. The citadel of Liege has been broken into.

Feb 6th:

...New idea: Carry out "H" and "Weser Exercise" only and guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war.....

Feb 21st.

Führer has talked with General v. Falkenhorst, and charges him with preparation of "Weser Exercise". Falkenhorst accepts gladly. Instructions issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces.

Proposal by Fromm, to take only units with German equipment. These would be 7th parachute (Flieger) Division, 22nd Division, 1 regiment of 1 Mountain Division, two divisions of the 7th wave, a motorised brigade (rifle brigade 11 with one armoured vehicle).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
CONT'D

H1152 - 0066

Feb 28th:

I propose, first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Führer, that case "Yellow" and "Weser Exercise" must be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces employed. Führer completely agrees, if this is in any way possible.

15.00 hrs - Staff Falkenhorst reports on preparations so far. In this connection, I explain to him the new basis for preparations.

Proposals for forces to be employed for:

N (Norway)	4 parachute companies.	22nd Inf Div or 16th Inf Regt.
	2 mountain divisions -	2 divisions of 7th wave.
D (Denmark)	1 corps headquarters.	Police division.
		1 division of 3rd wave.
		L of C division.

It is still under consideration, whether reinforced rifle brigade 11 should go to Group D (task force for Denmark) and then to N (Norway) or straight to N (Norway).

Proposed number of combat planes too high.

Feb 29th:

15.00 hrs. Report of Staff Falkenhorst with Kranke, Buchenhagen, Kraus very satisfactory to the Fuhrer. He agrees with the proposals.

Fuhrer also wishes to have a strong task force (Gruppe) in Copenhagen and a plan, elaborated in detail, showing how individual coastal batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont (Chef L) instructed to make out immediately the order to the Army, Navy and Air Force, and Director of Armed Forces, Central Office, to make out a similar order re strenghtening the Staff.

Mar. 3rd:

Führer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of a sift entry into N (Norway) with strong forces.

No delay by any branch of the Armed Forces. Very rapid acceleration of the attack necessary.

C-in-C of the Air Force opposes any subordination of unity of the Air Force to 21st Army Corps.

Führer decides to carry out "Weser Exercise" before case "Yellow" with a few days interval.

H1152 - 0067

5th March.

1500 hours. Big conference with the three Commanders-in-Chief about "Weser Exercise". Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till now. Won't listen to anyone and wants to show that all preparations so far made are worthless.

Result:
a) Stronger forces to Narvik
b) Navy to leave ships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in Trondheim),
c) Christiansand can be left out at first.
d) 6 divisions envisaged for Norway.
e) A foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen.

7th March.

Falkenhorst with Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. The preparations are now taking firm shape. The Führer signs a directive containing all changes subsequent to the conference of March 5th. Nothing is to be changed anymore now.

13 March.

Führer does not give order yet for "W" (Weser Exercise). He is still looking for an excuse.

14th March.

English keep vigil in the North Sea with 15 to 16 submarines, doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent operations by Germans. Führer has not yet decided what reason to give for "Weser Excerise". Wrong news report in American Press.

C.in C. of the Navy is doubtful whether it is still important to play the (word missing) in N (Norway). Open to question whether it would not be better to undertake case "Yellow" before "Weser Exercise". Danger that in that case the English would immediately land at Narvik, as we would have been the first to violate neutrality.....

28th March.

The Norwegians are interning U21, seemingly because of maladroit statements of the commander, who did not claim engine trouble but mistaken navigation. But it may also be that a mistake was made in translation. Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the Weser exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the other two commanders are worrying about matters which are none of their business. Kranke sees more disadvantages than advantages.

In the evening the Fuhrer visits the map room and roundly declares that he won't stand for the Navy clearing out of the Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim and Oslo will have to remain occupied by naval forces. Bad impression on land forces.

29th March.

Talk with Commander in Chief of the Navy, 1200 hours. Wants decision about use of air mines.

Führer talks to him alone about retention of ships. Admiral of the Fleet (Grossadmiral) rejects Narvik, but wants to examine whether Trondheim cannot be set up as a base immediately.

2nd April.

1530 hours: Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Führer. All confirm preparations completed. Führer orders carrying out of the Weser exercise for April 9th.

H1152 - 0068

4th April

Fuhrer drafts the proclamations. Piepenbrock, Chief of Military Intelligence 1 (Chef Abwehr 1) returns with good results from the talks with Quisling in Copenhagen.

9th April

The surprise effect succeeds in Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik, and from the air in Stavanger. Not at Christiansand and in Oslo.

Bluecher sinks after a heroic fight, Commanding Admiral and Commander 103 (Kdr 103) of it, on deck up to the last moment, swim to land.

Luetzow has to take over lead and lower boats.

Heavy fighting for coastal fortifications. Fortress Christiansand surrendered to attack by planes and Karlsruhe.

19th April

Renewed crisis. Envoy Braver is recalled; since Norway is at war with us, the task of the Foreign Office is finished. In the Fuhrer's opinion, force has to be used. It is said that Gauleiter Terboven will be given a post. Field Marshal (Goering)? is moving in the same direction. He critices as defects, that we didn't fake sufficiently energetic measures a gainst the civilian population, that we could have seized electrical plant, that the Navy didn't supply enough troops. The Air Force can't do everything.

21st Mardh

Misgivings of Task Force 21 (= reinforced 21st Army Corps) about the long interval between taking up readiness positions at 05.30 hours and close of diplomatic negotiations. Fuhrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up, it must be ruthlessly broken. The political plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken, and even exaggerate them.

H-1152

BRITISH DOCUMENT BOOK

NO. 3 (ENGLISH)

British Document Book No. 3

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H1152-0069